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Marianne Kamp

University of Wyoming, mkamp@uwyo.edu

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PILGRIMAGE AND PERFORMANCE: UZBEK WOMEN AND THE IMAGINING OF UZBEKISTAN IN THE 1920s

In August 1924, Anabibi Safaeva set off from her home city of Khiva, which was then the capital of the Xorezm People’s Republic, to study in Tashkent, which was the administrative center of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Safaeva traveled with some 160 students in a convoy of three boats down the Amu River toward the Aral Sea. However, misfortune befell Safaeva: her boat was attacked by basmachis, a bandit or rebel gang. The basmachis killed all twenty-two of the men in Safaeva’s group and carried off the women as captives. By the time that Safaeva was rescued, more than two months later, there was no longer a Xorezm People’s Republic or a Turkistan Republic; instead, Safaeva’s Khivan home was now in Uzbekistan, and Tashkent, the goal of her academic pilgrimage, had become the capital of Uzbekistan.

Safaeva waited for several years after her abduction before attempting to travel to Tashkent again, finally going there in 1927 to study at the Central Asian Communist University. She worked for the Communist Party of Uzbekistan as an activist in the Tashkent regional Women’s Division while she was studying, and in 1931 she was sent by the party to Uzbekistan’s Bukhara province to participate in the collectivization of agriculture. There she was poisoned, presumably by someone who opposed the state’s appropriation of land.

Anabibi Safaeva was one of thousands of young women who joined in what Benedict Anderson refers to as the pilgrimage of modern education. In the Netherlands Indies, as in other colonies, the twentieth-century colonial school-system brought into being pilgrimages which paralleled longer-established functionary journeys. From all over the vast colony, but nowhere outside it, the tender pilgrims made their inward, upward way, meeting fellow-pilgrims from different, perhaps once hostile, villages in primary school; from different ethno-linguistic groups in middle-school; and from every part of the realm in the tertiary institutions of the capital.

Anderson argues that both the “circumscribed ascent” of “native” functionaries in colonies and the similarly circumscribed path of modern schooling in the colonies...
enabled those whose paths were thus delimited to imagine their administrative unit as a nation. The “native” administrator in India might have gone to the British metropole for education, but his career was to be played out in India; he might be moved laterally within India, but would never become a local administrator in the British Isles. In describing the careers of creole functionaries who may be seen as the inventors of New World nationalisms, Anderson writes: “the apex of his looping climb, the highest administrative centre to which he could be assigned, was the capital of the imperial administrative unit in which he found himself.”

This article argues that through similar pilgrimages, Central Asians, both men and women, in the newly delineated Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan began to see themselves as Uzbeks, an identity that was defined and reproduced in public celebrations. Through both pilgrimages and performances, Uzbeks began to imagine and experience a new form of political community in the 1920s. The creation of Uzbekistan was one step in a rather long project that eventually transformed a Russian colony into an independent state, one whose borders were simply invented. The movement of people within those borders—the circumscribed ascent of students, party members, and government workers—was an essential component in the invention of Uzbekistan. Throughout the Soviet period, Uzbeks could expect access to positions and opportunities within Uzbekistan but did not find doors opened wide within the larger boundaries of the Soviet Union.

Public performance played an important role in the imagining of the nation: in the 1920s, political leaders challenged the Uzbek public with their own modernizing vision of the nation at mass unveiling meetings. Unveiling became a ritual act that had both personal and political significance for the women who chose to unveil, and who persuaded others to do so. In these public unveiling shows, identity with the state was performative, and a gender subversion was a declaration of loyalty to the state and the Communist Party. Of the many thousands of women who rejected the norms of Central Asian urban Muslim culture by suddenly revealing their faces in public, hundreds were murdered between 1927 and 1929. The unveilings, and the social backlash that unveilings stirred, were the crucible within which women became Uzbek citizens.

FROM TURKISTAN TO UZBEKISTAN

An analysis of the invention of Uzbekistan benefits from an awareness that Turkistan was one of the Russian empire’s late conquests. While in earlier periods of conquest the Russian empire had incorporated conquered aristocracies, Turkistan was held under military, not civilian, rule. Turkistan included five oblast, or provinces, that were conquered between the 1850s and 1876. In the two northern provinces of Turkistan, which are now part of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the tsarist government allowed and encouraged peasant settlers from European Russia to seize lands that were used by the dominant nomadic population. However, in the southern three provinces of Turkistan, Syr Darya, Samarkand, and Fergana—lands that formerly belonged mainly to the Kokand khanate, where the population predominantly practiced sedentary agriculture on irrigated lands—the government permitted European settlement only in towns and cities, on lands made arable by new irrigation projects, and on lands seized...
Russia in these three provinces of Turkistan were connected with the military, with the administration, or with business.

Russian military administrators headed military districts, but Uzbeks, Sarts, Tajiks, and other locals provided the civilian administration for small towns and villages, where more than 80 percent of the population lived. In the 1870s, the governor-general began to establish schools in order to train native people to serve in local administration. These native administrators were treated as a colonial population. While a Russian administrator in the civil service might follow a career path through the Russian provinces, the Caucasus, Turkistan, and Siberia, Uzbeks who were trained for administration certainly would not be transferred to an administrative post outside Turkistan.

Russian administrators did not become a creole population, and the native population did not become assimilated into Russian ranks. In the words of Andreas Kappeler:

The objective of the policies was no longer the gradual integration of the Muslims [as the policy toward Muslims in Russia and in the Caucasus had been] but segregation. Colonial rule, bearing resemblances to the British model, upheld the arrangements prevailing in local administration, social organization, culture and religion. . . . The protection of traditional relationships seemed to be the best means toward maintaining Russian rule. The policy of segregation and non-interference went to such lengths that the old Muslim realms of Bukhara and Khiva remained formally independent protectorates . . . . The segregated Muslims were officially declared to be second class citizens.

Uzbekistan was an administrative unit created by the government of the Soviet Union in October 1924 and was described in terms of the Soviet nationalities policy as an entity, a Socialist Republic, which would not be independent or sovereign, but which would serve the development of national consciousness as a step on the road to internationalism. Uzbekistan was put together from parts of the former Turkistan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), the Bukhara People’s Republic, and the Xorezm People’s Republic; its native population included people who designated themselves Uzbeks, Sarts, Turks, Tajiks, Kazaks, etc. It was as transparently artificial in its boundaries as the administrative units of the Spanish empire in South America had been in the early 19th century, but like those units, it became the locus of identity and loyalty for those whose lives were shaped by this non-sovereign state. The Uzbekistan SSR was given the trappings of a nation-state—one that presented an Uzbek face to its citizens, addressed its citizens in Uzbek and as Uzbeks, and encouraged the participation of Uzbeks, both women and men, in public occasions, in pilgrimages to the center, and in performances.

From 1917 to 1919, Turkistan’s course was uncertain. When the February 1917 revolution took place in Russia, Turkistan’s Uzbek-language press declared freedom and celebrated the end of colonialism. The territory slipped from Russian control, as the tsarist army units, which had held Turkistan under strict military rule from the time of the 1916 uprising until the February 1917 revolution, lost their direction. Between February and September 1917, Turkistani nationalists and Turkistani traditionalists, Russian colonialists and Russian revolutionaries vied for political control of Tashkent, while contests for control in other regions of Turkistan also became localized. Between September 1917 and 1919, a sort of Soviet government came to power in Tashkent, but it was cut off from the Russian center by the civil war that
raged in southern Russia. The Soviet government of Turkistan’s claim to be the legitimate government was open to question. Turkistani nationalists gathered in Kokand in January 1918 and declared Turkistan to be autonomous under their government. The Soviet government in Tashkent sent the military and crushed the autonomous government at Kokand in February 1918, but the rebel movement, now dispersed throughout the Central Asian hinterlands, carried on warfare against the Soviet government of Turkistan until 1923, with small bands of rebels, called basmachi by their enemies, continuing their struggle into the 1930s. The central government of the Soviet Union committed increasing military and political support to the Soviet government in Tashkent, and by 1920 the future of Turkistan was clear: there would be no separation from the former Russian empire, and although the administrative unit was named the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), there was little autonomy either, except de facto in branches of administration, such as the Islamic courts and Islamic schools, over which the government was as yet unable to assert total control.

NATIONALIZING TURKISTAN

By 1920, it also became clear that the Soviet government held an understanding of “nationalities” that would lead to the redefining of borders in Central Asia in accordance with the Soviet Nationalities Commission’s assessment of the population’s ethnic identities. In the early 20th century, while acknowledging ethnic differences among Turkistan’s Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Turcoman populations, many of Turkistan’s progressive Muslims, the Jadids, preferred to think of all Muslims in Central Asia as Turkistanis, a people who shared a Turkic language and a religion. They thus posed a collective identity that emphasized the greatest possible unity among Central Asia’s native population and its juxtaposition against its colonizing Other, the Russian. However, the proponents of a unified Turkistan divided after February 1917 into those who sought accommodation with Soviet communists who promised progress and autonomy, and those who immediately or ultimately turned against Soviet government, which they saw as a betrayal of the Turkistan vision and a continuation of colonialism. Between 1917 and 1920, Soviet control over Central Asia grew amid struggle and warfare, culminating in the dispatch of the Turkistan Commission from Moscow to Tashkent in 1920 to bring Moscow’s order to the Turkistan Communist Party and administration. The Turkistan Commission intended “to break up the multinational state structure of the Turkestan ASSR and to redraw its administrative boundaries in conformity with its ethnographic divisions,” this being deemed essential for ending warfare (which the Soviets believed sprang from ethnic differences), for undermining clan divisions and creating a situation in which class stratification and socialist development could take place, and to satisfy an “‘elemental longing’ of the nationalities to possess their own state.” Francine Hirsh argues that the national-territorial delimitation of Central Asia should not be dismissed as a devious strategy of “divide and rule” or accepted as proof of the Soviet regime’s “ethnophilia,” but instead should be understood as a manifestation of the Soviet regime’s attempt to define a new (and presumably nonimperialistic) model of colonization. Certainly the Bolshevik did consider that dividing Turkistan would reduce the possibility of some sort of anti-Soviet Turk federation, but the approach—territorial de-
limitation—was consistent with Soviet nationalities policy toward other ethnic groups. In the 1920s, this policy promoted a vast increase in popular participation in schools, public matters, and administration among the “natives” of the newly defined national republics. If Uzbeks needed their own state, then it was also necessary that the state be run by Uzbeks.

Between 1920 and 1924, Uzbek-language publications noted nationality when discussing individuals and group activities. If women attended a conference, then the number of Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen women in attendance was duly noted. In 1922, the Regional Women’s House of Enlightenment (Ulka Xotin-qizlar Bilim Yurti) underwent a name change to become the Uzbek Women and Girls’ House of Enlightenment (O‘zbek Xotin-qizlar Bilim Yurti). In its early years, the teacher-training institute had accepted students who spoke a Turkic language without particular attention to ethnicity, but the name change reflected the idea that this institution belonged to Uzbeks, and was followed by a proposal that other nationalities should make up no more than 10 percent of the student body. Immediately, women and girls in Tashkent who had more commonly referred to their ethnicity as “Turk” had a bit of incentive to identify themselves as Uzbeks; being Uzbek brought greater access to the rare and precious resource of state-sponsored education.

Uzbekistan’s status vis-a-vis the Soviet center was not truly analogous to Turkistan’s relationship to the Russian imperial center. Turkistan was very clearly a colony, and its inhabitants were colonial subjects. But the relationship between the inhabitants of Uzbekistan and the Soviet government was that of citizenship. The building of socialism demanded high rates of citizen participation in the public realm (though not in the public sphere in Jurgen Habermas’s sense), and operated through very direct state intervention in the lives of citizens. While the colonial government of Turkistan exercised its authority indirectly and had no need for a mobilized population—indeed, it had an interest only in “pacifying” the population—the Soviet government and the Uzbekistan Communist Party could carry out their modernizing, socialist project only by recruiting large numbers of activists, training them in schools and brief courses, and redistributing them throughout the territory of Uzbekistan. The ideology of the Communist Party asserted the importance of women’s equality and women’s equal activity in the public realm with men. The party and the government put significant resources into recruiting Uzbek women into schools, the party, and the administration.

WOMEN AND THE SOVIET PILGRIMAGE

Increasing government control over Turkistan brought with it an increase in activism among women. The Communist Party began to coordinate its efforts to propagandize and recruit women by establishing the Women’s Division in 1919; in mid-1920, the Turkistan Communist Party’s Women’s Division opened a “Muslim section” in Tashkent’s old city. Between 1920 and 1924, small numbers of Uzbek women in Turkistan, Bukhara, and Khiva began to embark on modern, state-sponsored pilgrimages that carried them to Tashkent and Turkistan’s regional centers for education, to participate in meetings for “women delegates,” and to see political power in action. Event sponsors and school administrators recruited young women for activities that would carry them far from their homes.
In the spring of 1921, the Women’s Division invited Turkistani delegates to attend a conference in Moscow for “Women of the East.” In Turkistan, Women’s Division workers carried out the rather arduous task of holding meetings in towns and provincial cities, convincing women to elect “delegates” for the conference, and arranging transportation to Tashkent. Among the elected delegates, there were some who ran away from home to circumvent a family head’s refusal of permission to travel. When the delegates assembled in Tashkent in May, they were informed that the “Women of the East” conference had been canceled, ostensibly due to Moscow’s food shortages. The women resolved to continue their pilgrimage, and the Turkistan Communist Party supplied the funds for their journey to Moscow. In Moscow, they attended a session of the Second International Congress of Communist Women—to which food shortages were apparently no obstacle—not as participants but for display purposes. Their presence at this meeting, in a parade honoring the Third Comintern Congress and in a play concerning liberation that they put on for Moscow workers, was reported by the Russian-language journal for Women’s Division organizers, Kommunistka. The visitors’ exotic garb, their veils and their unveiling, and their halting speeches received notice, but the Eastern women themselves went nameless.23 For the Turkistani women, the journey was a first opportunity to travel far from home, and some found it a life-changing experience. Many of the participants unveiled on returning to Turkistan and became activists for women’s rights.24

Other Uzbek women made pilgrimages to Moscow, Baku, and even outside the USSR, to Germany, for study. Norjon Abdusalomova, who was Anabibi Safaeva’s friend, traveled from Khiva to Moscow to study at the Communist University for Toilers of the East. When she finished her education in 1927, she returned to Uzbekistan, and after directing the regional teacher’s training school in Khiva, she moved to Tashkent, entered the career of a party activist there, and was soon elected to the city council.25 Another young woman from Xorezm, Maryam Sultanova, was among a group of seventy-three students sent to Germany in 1923 from Bukhara and Xorezm for study. She studied teaching in Darmstadt and, on returning to Uzbekistan, became a journalist in Samarkand and Tashkent.26 Although a few dozen Uzbek women studied abroad in the early 1920s—a pilgrimage that entailed learning a foreign language—travel to Tashkent to study at an Uzbek-language institute was a more likely course. Sobira Xoldorova, an Uzbek girl from the Ferghana Valley, went to Tashkent in 1923 to enter the Uzbek Women and Girls’ Bilim Yurt; she studied journalism in Moscow but made her career as a journalist in Uzbekistan. She rose through the party structure to become an important figure in Tashkent city administration before her arrest in the 1938 purges.27 Whether through education or through work assignments and recruitment into the party, these women, drawn from all over Uzbekistan, were funneled through the capital, met one another, and interacted in meetings and events organized by the Women’s Division, where their common identities as women and Uzbeks defined the parameters for their public activism.

The Xorezm People’s Republic came into existence when a group of young revolutionaries, with active support from the Soviet government and Red Army, overthrew the warlord who had disposed of the Khan of Khiva (the hereditary head of the Russian protectorate) in 1918. The Bukhara People’s Republic, similarly, came into being
in 1920 when revolutionaries, with the active involvement of the Turkistan ASSR government, took over the government of Bukhara (which had also been a Russian empire protectorate) and drove the emir into exile. The two People's Republics were autonomous enough to create their own constitutions, which were not based on the Soviet constitution, but their boundaries with the Turkistan ASSR were, clearly, quite permeable. Not only did students from Bukhara and Xorezm make their way to Tashkent for education, but, more important, administrators and officials from Turkistan were assigned to positions in the two republics.

Tojixon Shodieva, an Uzbek woman born near Kokand, studied at the party school in Tashkent and in 1922 was sent to Xorezm to work for the Women's Division of the Xorezm Communist Party. The next year, the party, which already was imagining Uzbekistan as a space and treating party members within it—both men and women—as interchangeable, sent Shodieva to the Kokand Women's Division. Two years later, the party made her the head of the Ferghana province Women's Division. When the Uzbekistan Communist Party held its first congress in February 1925, Shodieva was there. The following year she was named to the party's Hujum commission, a group of seven high-ranking party members who designed the “Attack” campaign, which promoted unveiling and the adoption of Soviet-style modernity. As head of Uzbekistan’s Women’s Division, she moved to Tashkent, then to Samarkand; until 1938, when she was purged from the party and sent to Siberia, her career took her to the Ferghana Valley and back to Tashkent. Shodieva moved about far more than most Uzbek women activists—for most, a brief stint in Uzbekistan's capital for education was the sole opportunity to obtain an image of Uzbekistan beyond their own region—but her career was distinctly Uzbek. Although she traveled to Moscow numerous times for conferences and spent several years studying in a Marxism–Leninism course there in the early 1930s, she worked only in Uzbekistan. To a significant degree, the colonial pattern of movement remained: Russian women who began their careers with Shodieva in the Women’s Division in Uzbekistan were assigned to administrative positions in Russia in the 1930s, and the central Communist Party often sent women from Russia to Uzbekistan for two or three years to aid in the project of liberating Uzbek women. But it would have been unthinkable for the party to assign an Uzbek woman to work in Russia’s Women’s Division. In the 1920s, an Uzbek activist woman’s ascent was circumscribed. Her highest attainable goal was Tashkent, not Moscow, and she regarded transforming Uzbek women, not transforming Soviet women, as her goal.

Critics of the early Soviet domination of Xorezm and Bukhara noted that significant numbers of Russian communists were sent there as “advisers” during their brief existence, but the transferability of Xorezm and Bukhara’s students and Turkistani administrators has greater significance for understanding how Uzbekistan could be imagined as a nation. When the two People’s Republics dissolved, and the creation of Uzbekistan was proclaimed in October 1924, most of the patterns of pilgrimage did not change; Bukharans, Khivans, and southern Turkistanis still made their way to Tashkent, and the doors were open for Uzbek advancement. In Moscow, in October 1924, a group of Bukharian students greeted the news of the delimitation with a demonstration and approving slogans. Undoubtedly, the party instructed them to do so, but
perhaps they also recognized that becoming part of this larger entity of Uzbekistan would present them with many more opportunities than could have been found in the Bukhara People’s Republic.33

PERFORMANCE: UNVEILING AND UZBEK IDENTITY

The delimitation of borders seems to have strengthened the government’s hand against the religious establishment. Although in 1922 the Turkestan government had returned seized waqf properties, in 1925 the government of Uzbekistan took control of most waqf lands and directed their proceeds toward government (not religious) education.34 Government investment in public education increased, with particular concern for expanding the very small number of Uzbek girls’ primary schools (education was gender segregated, as were most aspects of Uzbek life) and expanding literacy courses. The government initiated land reform in the same year, sending teams of assessors to each village, seizing lands of large landowners and dead lands, and giving land to landless cultivators, including women.35 Local government changed form as councils (soviets) were established, and the government intervened to ensure that government supporters would be elected, including Uzbek women.36 The newly established Uzbek-language women’s journal Yangi Yo’l publicized all of these initiatives and, in the process, defined Uzbek womanhood for its audience.

In the pages of Yangi Yo’l, veiling and unveiling were central to defining, depicting, and transforming Uzbek women. Veiling meant wearing the paranji—an oversize robe with false sleeves, draped from the head to cover the whole body, and the chachvon, a black horse-hair net that also draped from the top of the head to cover the whole face and front of the body. In Yangi Yo’l’s stories and illustrations, Uzbek women wore the paranji and chachvon, while other women did not. Women from families that had called themselves Turk or Sart were now identified as Uzbek by their dress, while the existence of Tajik women, who generally wore the paranji and chachvon, and nomadic Uzbek women, who did not, was ignored.

In the sketch from Yangi Yo’l (see Figure 1), dress delineated identity. The figure shows the increase in numbers of Uzbek women participating in councils, with the objective of demonstrating that Uzbekistan had become more successful at bringing Uzbek women into public activity than Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan had with regard to women of their titular nationality. A few simple lines assured the reader that if she wore a paranji (no chachvon in this picture), she was Uzbek. Headlines, captions, and stories all identified their subjects as Uzbek and discussed other Central Asian women only in their “own” contexts: Tajiks were from Tajikistan, not Uzbekistan, while women who worked in the newly opened silk factories were Uzbek or “European.”

If veiling in the paranji–chachvon defined Uzbek women, then unveiling would become the most recognized symbol of the Uzbek woman’s transformation. Unveiling had been discussed in Turkestan in the 1910s, and after the establishment of Soviet government, individuals and small groups of women unveiled. Often these were women who were enrolled in modern schools, who were activists, or who came from the families of reformers.37 At the first congress of the Uzbek Communist Party, in February 1925, five Uzbek women from Ferghana province “unveiled”—that is, they removed their chachvons from their faces. Their spokeswoman, Ruzabakieva,
proclaimed their unveiling to be a sign of their promise to the Party to carry on its work among Uzbek women. However, this link between party loyalty and unveiling was less salient within unveiling discourse than reference to modern life and modern education.

In the mid-1920s, Uzbek activists regarded unveiling as a defining feature of the modern Uzbek woman, and of the modern Uzbek nation. In Oidin’s 1925 play, “A Step Toward Modernity,” which she wrote for the 8 March International Women’s Day holiday, the protagonist, Mastura, was initially afraid to become involved with a collective workshop organized by the Women’s Division because she believed that she would be forced to unveil. By the end of the play, Mastura still wore her paranji—the women’s collective had not forced her to unveil—but her daughter, who was attending
a Soviet school, went to the theater unveiled. By 1926, leaders of various organizations and enterprises, such as a silk factory in Namangan, began to hold public unveilings and to recognize women who unveiled with certificates. In Tashkent on Women’s Day that year, Bashorat Jalolova tried to spark a mass unveiling by making a speech at the square in the old city and throwing off her paranji and chachvon. Later that year, the Central Asia Bureau announced its program for the rapid transformation of society, the Hujum (Attack), which sought to change women’s social status rapidly through increased work and educational opportunities and aggressive enforcement of laws that gave women equal rights. In Uzbekistan, the Hujum quickly became associated with mass, public unveilings. Throughout February 1927, local party divisions hosted unveiling meetings, and governmental bodies, schools, and organizations propagated for the upcoming International Women’s Day, which was to be celebrated with mass unveilings of Uzbek women.

The Soviet Union’s leadership promoted Soviet holidays and disapproved of religious holidays. Public gatherings on the Soviet holidays—1 May (Labor), 9 November (Revolution), 8 March (Women)—were occasions for inculcating and celebrating the revolution’s values. However, Uzbek leaders, speaking in Uzbek to an Uzbek public, also made these public events into occasions for nation-building. On 3 March 1926, for example, a public gathering in Tashkent recognized the formation of Uzbekistan’s “national division” of the Red Army. At this meeting, Faizulla Xo’jaev, chairman of the Uzbekistan People’s Commissars, gave a speech in which he praised the young men from Uzbekistan who had volunteered for the national brigade. While recognizing that Uzbekistan was a part of a larger union, he connected the brigade primarily to Uzbekistan, proclaiming, “The Uzbekistan national troops who are being formed are the force that will protect Uzbekistan’s freedom!”

On Women’s Day, the emphasis on unveiling turned Uzbekistan’s 8 March celebration into an occasion for the public contestation of Uzbek values and a performance of a new Uzbek identity. Calls to attend Women’s Day celebrations were addressed to Uzbek women. To celebrate International Women’s Day, other women, such as Russians, were to play the role of supporters of Uzbek women. The ceremonies held in cities and towns on Women’s Day in 1927 included speeches by political leaders, followed by a parade of women approaching a central platform. These women individually proclaimed their liberation and threw their paranji and chachvon onto a bonfire. The crowd listened to music as the veils burned. These paranji-burning rituals took place on every Women’s Day from 1927 into the 1930s, and on many other holidays, as well.

For Uzbek activist women, removing and burning one’s paranji was the ultimate symbol of transformation from housebound, unenlightened slave to modern, educated, politically active, liberated human being. International Women’s Day became a day on which Uzbeks demonstrated whether they would support the modern version of Uzbek womanhood or would express their anger against the state’s modernizing, interventionist agenda by threatening, attacking, and even murdering unveiled women. Activist women were aware that many unveilings were coerced and that a radical transformation that included education, participation in public activities, and entrance into the paid labor force did not necessarily follow the mass unveilings. However, this did not change their approach. They believed in the drama and symbolism of unveiling
and of going out in public unveiled. They called for more propaganda and better government support for women’s programs, but they did not want to abandon the ritual of public unveiling.

In April 1929, after two years of agitation for unveiling, and hundreds of murders, Uzbek women activists demonstrated for a legal ban on veiling and received support from Yo’ldosh Oxunboboev, chairman of the Uzbekistan Soviets. A transformation in consciousness was not enough to protect women. The activists wanted to force modernity on their fellow Uzbeks by law. However, Uzbekistan was not independent. Even if the activist Uzbek women’s petitions had found enough agreement in the Uzbekistan Communist Party—and they did not—Moscow made the decision that there would be no decree against veiling.

The contest over veiling in Uzbekistan took place within a setting of great social upheaval. Throughout the Soviet Union in the late 1920s, land reform and dispossession of wealthy peasants resulted in large numbers of malcontents, and the beginning of collectivization brought even greater turmoil. That activists were murdered was not unusual, but in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek experience differed sharply from the Russian experience. Veiling and unveiling were potent symbols for Uzbeks. Russians who lived in the Uzbekistan republic and were members of the party or the Soviets could and did participate in anti-veil agitation, but the Hujum did not define them in the way that it defined Uzbeks. For Uzbeks, deciding to unveil came to mean supporting the government, while attacking the unveiled expressed hostility to the Uzbekistan Communist Party, the government of Uzbekistan, and the vision of modernity that those bodies articulated.

**Conclusion**

During the sixty-seven years that Soviet Uzbekistan existed, the patterns of pilgrimage that had been established early in the Soviet period continued. Students from the provinces went to Uzbekistan’s capital, Tashkent, and to its larger provincial centers for education. For Uzbeks, studying elsewhere in the USSR was unusual and very rarely resulted in permanent settlement outside Uzbekistan. Those who joined the Communist Party became part of the Uzbekistan Communist Party, and their career paths took them around Uzbekistan and upward to its capital but almost never outside the republic. Uzbek women, though less mobile than men and less active in political life, were shaped as Soviet citizens in the same schools, through the same sorts of pilgrimages, and with the same limitations and looping ascent as Uzbek men. They were taught a history that commemorated the 8 March 1927 unveilings on decennial anniversaries, with tales of the suffering and martyrdom of the unveiled, whose blood was the cost of becoming modern, Soviet Uzbeks.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Uzbekistan declared its independence, it did so without change to its borders. Uzbekistan as a Soviet administrative unit had operated with processes that contributed to the imagining of a nation. Human networks within the Uzbekistan Communist Party, the administration, and most sectors of the economy had given Uzbeks a strong interest in maintaining the state in its Soviet-era boundaries. Pilgrimages to the Uzbek center reproduced Uzbek identity.

However, shared experiences of the Soviet era, including the public performance
of unveiling, shaped the content of Soviet Uzbek identity in ways that many Uzbeks do not wish to remember. Ernest Renan wrote, “[T]he essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things.” Unveiling, land reform, collectivization, and the state’s attack on Muslim institutions in the 1920s were all central elements in the formation of Soviet Uzbekness. In the process of becoming a nation, Uzbeks committed acts of violence against one another that many would prefer to forget.

Although the Soviet-era borders and pilgrimages within them continue, post-Soviet Uzbekistan’s approach to national history, in the first few years of independence, gave strong emphasis to pre-Soviet elements, such as the Timurid legacy. It seems that the violence and division that formed Uzbek society in the 1920s, including stories of the Hujum, are to be forgotten. During the Soviet period, the periodical press in Uzbekistan commemorated the events of the Hujum on every decennial anniversary of the 1927 Women’s Day. The contrast between 1987, when a significant historical collection, Khudzhum Znachit Nastuplenie, was published along with many briefer articles, and 1997 could not be more stark. In 1997, Women’s Day was celebrated in the Uzbek-language press—including in the major newspapers Ozbekistan Haqiqati, Turkiston, Ozbekistan Adabiyot va Sa’anati, and in the women’s journal Saodat—as Mother’s Day, and there was not a single article mentioning 1927, the Hujum, or unveiling. A recent, authoritative history of Soviet Uzbekistan tries to negotiate the minefield of the Hujum without rejecting Soviet efforts to bring about women’s equality. In this version, there are no perpetrators among Uzbeks, only victims, and the volume takes a similar approach to the painful topics of collectivization, purge, and terror.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, there were predictions among scholars of Central Asia that there might be a reconfiguration of states, including dreams of a resurrection of Turkistan. But the processes of state development in Uzbekistan and other former Soviet republics gave reality to the 1924 borders. Within each republic, pilgrimages to the republic’s capital helped form the networks of party, government, institutions of learning, and so on, and these internal networks, crucial to the livelihood of those with power and influence, were far stronger than ties to extra-republic networks. A Soviet state that needed high rates of participation in the public realm to achieve its modernizing goals created opportunities for young Uzbeks in the 1920s to move about, to see Uzbekistan, and to imagine their Soviet Uzbek homeland. The Soviet state’s emphasis on women’s participation promoted women’s dramatic performances of unveiling in the Hujum, and women activists made unveiling a ritual to mark Uzbek women’s entrance into modern, Soviet citizenship. Not these performances alone but the militant anti-traditionalism of the Hujum’s leaders and their coercion of fellow Uzbeks, as well as the violent response in the murders of unveiled women, shaped Uzbek society and memory. In the legacy of post-independence Uzbekistan, forgetting, in Renan’s words, may indeed be “a crucial factor in the creating of a nation.”

NOTES

1The term basmachi (attacker or bandit) was used by the Soviet government to denote anti-Soviet guerrilla groups. Whether Safaeva’s attackers were politically motivated anti-Soviet warriors or just bandits cannot be known.
Incidentally, by 1927, Tashkent was not the capital of Uzbekistan; the capital moved to Samarkand in 1926 and remained there until 1931.


Judith Butler discusses gender identification as performative, leading to the possibility that other forms of identification, such as national identity, may also be performative. She sees the potential for agency within the variation of the repeated acts and performances that establish the social meaning of gender. The dramatic performances of unveiling in Uzbekistan raise complex questions concerning identity and agency and the possibility of subversion or resistance: Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 141–45.


For an examination of the Russian empire’s varying practices in incorporating conquered peoples into the Russian aristocracy, and later the Russian model of citizenship, see Dov Yaroshevski, “Empire and Citizenship,” and Austin Lee Jershild, “From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire,” in *Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples: 1700–1917*, ed. Daniel Brower and Edward Lazzerini (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 58–79, 101–14, respectively. One very significant difference between Turkistani subjects and other subjects of the Russian empire was that Turkistanis had no military obligation; in addition, they were not granted passports in the early 20th century when Russian peasants and others occupying the lowest tier of Russian citizenship received internal passports.


The administration used *tuzemnyi* (from this place), and *korennyi* (fundamental, root) to refer to the native population of Turkistan. These adjectives remained in ordinary parlance through the Soviet period and made their way into Uzbek as *tub* (real, foundational, native).


Bennigsen and Wimbush asserted that Muslim National Communists “rejected on principle Soviet plans for creating small, modern nations in the different ethnic regions of the Muslim borderlands. In 1924 they opposed the division of Central Asia into five national republics”: Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 67. However, while it is true that certain Turkistan Muslim Communists and nationalists such as Mustafa Chokaev clung to the vision of unity, others, such as Faizulla Xo‘jaev, seem to have adopted the new division of national states in Central Asia with enthusiasm. In Viadyanath’s volume, which was based on a fairly thorough examination of the Russian-language public record from 1924 and later scholarship, it seems clear that while some of the Turkistan Communist Party’s members advocated a single Central Asian republic, others advocated division into several republics, and most argumentation concerned which of the new “nations” would claim the most desirable territories: Viadyanath, Formation, 166–83. Hirsh shows that petitioners who questioned the borders were primarily concerned with being separated from the republic that represented their ethnic group, such as Kazakhs living in the new Uzbekistan or Uzbeks living in Kirgizia: Hirsh, “Toward an Empire of Nations,” 215–19.

Viadyanath, Formation, 165.


Viadyanath, Formation, 151–52, describes the disagreement between Soviet and anti-Soviet scholarship (or polemics) regarding the delimitation of national borders.


Uzbekistan State Archive, F. 34, o. 1, d. 1014, l. 3, l. 42, l. 46. Marianne Kamp, “Unveiling Uzbek Women: Liberation, Representation and Discourse, 1906–1929” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1998), 142–43. In Tashkent, until the mid-1920s, much of the population used “Turk” rather than “Uzbek” in identifying their ethnic group. The name change for the Bilim Yurt and its rationale concerning the future favoring of Uzbeks over other ethnic groups seems to have had little influence on the actual numbers of attendees. Reports from later in the 1920s showed that Uzbeks were the majority of students, as indeed they had been in 1922, but that other groups made up far more than 10 percent in the school.

Rakhima Aminova, The October Revolution and Women’s Liberation in Uzbekistan (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 14.


this mobility for Russian women may not apply to creoles—that is, Russian women activists who were born in Central Asia. Some, such as Netesova, certainly spent their whole careers in Uzbekistan.


The major exceptions were towns in the areas of Turkistan, which were made part of the Kazakhstan ASSR; Uzbeks, Kazaks, and others from the cities of Chimkent (Shymkent) and Turkistan had close connections with Tashkent in the imperial period, but Kazaks were now reoriented toward Ak Mechet and then Alma-Ata. Some Chimkent Uzbeks went to study in Tashkent in the 1920s and stayed on to make careers in Uzbekistan. For example, Muharram Arifxanova, “Ot parandzhi—k nauke” in Probuzhdennye, 130–39.

The newspaper Turkiston reported demonstrations in support of delimitation by Bukharan and other Central Asian students in Moscow on the arrival of Faizulla Xo’jaev and the Bukhara delegation for the signing of the delimitation documents: “Moskavda O’rta Osiyoning milli jumhuriyatlarga bo’linish tuntanasi,” Turkiston (3 October 1924), 1.

Shoshanna Keller, The Struggle Against Islam in Uzbekistan, 1921–1941: Policy, Bureaucracy, and Reality (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1995), 170–81. Waqf properties were seized in 1918 in areas where the Tashkent Soviet government had control; Park saw the gradual reversal of this policy between 1919 and 1922 as a government attempt to compromise with Central Asian Muslims who were furious about the nationalization of mosques, schools, and endowment lands, and the 1922 law that returned waqf properties with state oversight as evidence of the strengthened position of the Soviet government. By contrast, he described the Uzbekistan government’s approach after 1925 as “cautious”: Park, Bolshevism, 218–20. Keller argues the opposite: the 1922 return of properties was an attempt to buy the favor of a hostile population, while the post-1925 approach was clearly oriented toward government takeover of all waqf properties: Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917–1941 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001).

Rarely was land given outright to a woman unless she was head of her household (widows, mainly). More often, it seems, the commissions confirmed women’s right to land that they already owned through inheritance: Marianne Kamp, “Land for Women, Too!” (unpublished paper presented at the conference, “Women in Central Asia,” Columbia University, April 1998).

The numbers of Uzbek women participating in public life was very small but grew. In 1925, there were 1,438 women elected to councils in Uzbekistan, of whom 627 were Uzbek; the following year, 3,904 women were elected, of whom 1,512 were “indigenous.” Perhaps more important, some 140,000 women participated in election meetings in 1926: Aminova, The October Revolution, 79–80.


S. A. Dmitrieva, “Kommunistki—na peredovykh pozitsiiakh obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Uzbekestana,” in Khudzhum Znachit Nastuplenie, 39–40. Of 389 delegates at the party convention, twenty-five were women; of eighteen names given, eight are “European” and ten are Muslim—presumably Uzbek; ibid., 38–39.

Oidin (Manzura Sobirova, Uzbek poet [1906–53]), Yangilikka qadam, 2nd ed. (Tashkent: O’zbekiston Davlat Nashriioti, 1926).

Interview with Malika-xon J., Namangan, 4 February 1993; Uzbekistan State Archive, Namangan filial, Fond 302, personal file for Hadicha Kunasheva. A. S., “Eski Toshqentda,” Qizil O’zbekiston, 5 March 1926. Jalolova was the director of the old city Women’s Division. Only her assistant seems to have followed her example.

In the early post-revolution period, Moscow coordinated political activities among the former Russian empire’s Muslims through the MusBiuro of the Communist Party, which was dissolved in the wake of the Sultan Galiev incident in 1923. In conjunction with the delimitation in Central Asia, the party established the Central Asia Bureau (SredAzBiuro) to oversee, coordinate, and direct policies in the new republics: Park, Bolshevism, 137–38. The Central Asia Bureau was staffed from Moscow, but Central Asians who ranked high in their parties, such as Faizulla Xo’jaev, were also key members.

S. L., “Eski Toshkentda Ta’risi Majliss,” Qizil O’zbekiston, 5 March 1926. Wimbush and Bennigsen describe an earlier form of native national military units, the Muslim Army of 1918–19, which was made up primarily of Tatars: Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism, 64–66. In 1925, the Uzbek-
istan Communist Party approved the creation of a national division of the Red Army that would be “an inseparable part of the Worker and Peasant Red Army of the USSR” and, at the same time, would “be a strong step forward in the area of national self-determination of the peoples of Central Asia”: Kommunisticheskia Partiia Uzbekistana v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s’eskov i plenumov, T. I, 1925–37 (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1987), 17–18, 54. The term in Uzbek, milli—which I translate here as “national”—was traditionally a term of religious communalism; in Uzbek parlance of the 1920s, milli soldiers would be native Central Asian Muslims.

Public unveilings took place on other holidays, as well.

Fuller accounts of the Hujum and the murder of hundreds or perhaps thousands of unveiled and activist Uzbek women can be found in Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat; Keller, Struggle Against Islam, chap. 7; Kamp, “Unveiling Uzbek Women,” chap. 4; Aminova, October Revolution, chap. 2.

Douglas Northrup shows, based on party archives, that the Uzbek Communist Party was “deeply hostile to the unveiling campaign” and that the majority of communist men refused to unveil their wives: Northrup, “Languages of Loyalty,” 191. My comments refer not to the party as a whole, but to the core of Uzbek activist women who were associated with the party, with the Women’s Division, or with the journal Yangi Yo‘l or other newspapers, and are based on readings of publications from the late 1920s in which these women represented their own views and actions. These few hundred women unveiled and continued to promote unveiling in the face of hostility. I would argue that whether male communists “unveiled their wives” tells us nothing about women’s own actions, attitudes, and agency. While Northrop emphasizes the ongoing veiling that so disturbed party leaders in the 1930s, the fact is that veiling in the paranji and chachvon decreased and by the 1950s was a rare exception, not the norm. Although the activist women who promoted unveiling in the 1920s were a tiny minority, their actions ultimately did bring about a very significant change in one area of gender performance: while older women continued to veil, after the Hujum, young girls did not take up veiling in paranji and chachvon, and this practice nearly died out. The party documents that focus on men’s hostility to unveiling do not help us account for this change.

In 1992–93, I interviewed thirty-four elderly women in Uzbekistan, most of whom identified themselves as Uzbek. This research was sponsored by a long-term research grant from International Research Exchanges (IREX). According to the elderly women whom I interviewed, coercion generally did not mean that authorities pulled veils from women in public but, rather, that husbands were threatened with firing if they did not convince wives to unveil. In some places, veil wearers and purchasers were fined, and schools and workplaces discriminated in favor of the unveiled: Kamp, “Unveiling Uzbek Women,” chap. 4.

Nayereh Tohidi, discussing Azerbaijan, where the movement toward unveiling began earlier than in Uzbekistan, notes that resistance to and resentment of women’s unveiling there arose in part from the perception that the women’s movement was “instigated primarily by the Soviet communists, who were merely continuing the policy of Russification under Tsarist rule”: Nayereh Tohidi, “Gendering the Nation: Reconfiguring National and Self-Identities in Azerbaijan,” in Hermeneutics and Honor: Negotiating Female “Public” Space in Islamicate Societies, ed. Asma Afsaruddin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1999), 104. The same association is made in Uzbekistan. I have heard numerous comments from young men that the Hujum was when “Russians made our women go naked.”

In 1927, 13 percent of Uzbekistan Communist Party members (and candidates) were women, but only 2.5 percent of members were Uzbek women. In 1933, women made up 14 percent of party members; in 1936, 15.7 percent; in 1976, 22 percent: Kommunisticheskaiia Partiia Uzbekistana v Tsifrakh (Tashkent: Uzbekistan 1979), Tables 37, 61, 78, 447.

After World War II, interpretations of the Hujum generally emphasized the participation of Russian women in Uzbek women’s liberation, an emphasis that supported the “friendship of nationalities” policy that was central to the USSR’s post-war unity. The activist autobiographies in Probuzhdeniye exemplify this.
