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DANGEROUS MEMORY: CONTRASTING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEMORIES OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE USING HUTUS IN THE UNITED STATES

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DANGEROUS MEMORY: CONTRASTING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEMORIES OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE USING HUTUS IN THE UNITED STATES

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In Rwandan genocidal discourse, there is the vast memory of Tutsi deaths in the public domain but less for the Hutu. In many ways, Hutus are grouped together as genocidaires even though some of them were victims of the genocide. Privately, individualized accounts of Hutus possibly points to a potential disconnect between the public memory of the genocide and personalized accounts. Perhaps, a greater deal of focus on private memory is necessary to delve into the complexities. Individual narratives are useful in providing answers to questions regarding political, societal, and economic contexts of mass atrocities such as genocides. Through memory scholarship, a diversification of public understanding courtesy of personal stories is possible. An acknowledgment of other stories does not minimize conventional stories but open up spaces for more inclusive discourses.
DANGEROUS MEMORY: CONTRASTING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEMORIES OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE USING HUTUS IN THE UNITED STATES

By

Cliff Ubba Kodero

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I dedicate this work to my family, especially my parents who instilled the in me the love for scholarship. I equally dedicate this thesis to my siblings, and most importantly my significant partner Alice Nikuzwe. Above all, this work, as well as my other works is aimed for the betterment of the continent of Africa.
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Chapter One: Introduction

It is twenty-one years since the Rwandan genocide occurred. Approximately eight hundred thousand Tutsis, but also moderate Hutus, died within a span of ninety days at the hands of Hutu extremists.\(^1\) Today, Rwanda is a country burdened with the horrors of the past but marching towards a hopeful future.\(^2\) Indeed, some Rwandans have pursued this better future by immigrating to the United States as refugees, green card holders, students, and visitors. Among the Rwandans in the United States are Hutus, usually lumped together in genocidal discourse as perpetrators.\(^3\) However, more nuanced views remind us that not all Hutus participated in the genocide, and many moderate Hutus were even victims of the tragic event.\(^4\) With the idea of respecting all concerned voices, this study aims to explore the memories of Hutus in the United States about the genocide.

This study compares individual Hutu memories, gathered through one-on-one interviews and from previously published accounts, \(^5\) with memories in public places such as museums, media, books, and the internet. The point is to discover if, and to what extent, individual memories of Hutus in the United States are represented in official accounts of the genocide. Conceivably, private memories of Hutus are not complimentary with the public remembrance of the genocide since the official commemorations focus on a Tutsi inspired story. The practical significance of this research is an attempt at addressing the frictions caused by undermined memories in peace and reconciliation. It will also expose complexities of genocide memories using accounts of Hutus in the United States. Most importantly, though limited by the number of interviewees, these narratives can provide provisional answers to questions concerning the political,

\(^3\) Robert Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (Lincoln, NE: IUniverse, 2005) pg. 83 & 156
\(^5\) One-on-one interviews here may include skype sessions, phone interviews as well as other electronic communications such as emails.
societal, and economic context of the memory of Rwandan genocide and other conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Justification

The rationale for this study stems from the argument that all victims and survivors of the Rwandan genocide deserve respect and acknowledgment. The realization of an all-inclusive memory environment is necessary for the development of space that allows individuals to heal. Reconciling the public memory displayed in the media and the books about the genocide with the personal memories is one-step towards healing. Healing is possible to the individual and the societal level only in a healthy memory environment. The possibility of healing is limited if there are dissimilarities between public and private memories. Herbert Hirsch, an expert on genocide studies, argues that what is said in present about past events determines memorialization. The conventional understanding, if written, influences future actions. Elisabeth King has explored Memories of genocide survivors in a paper titled “Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for Peacebuilding,” and Jennie Burnet in her book Genocide Lives in Us, among others. Unfortunately, there is a gap in the literature on the memory of Hutu diaspora. The lack of scholarship on Hutu memories of the genocide has prompted this study. By exploring this aspect of the genocide, this thesis will enrich scholarship on the Rwandan genocide by providing this critical component of the tragic event.

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8 Herbert Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory Studying Death to Preserve Life (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995) Pg. 10
Research Questions

In the form of research questions, I ask the following: How is the Rwandan genocide remembered in public places? What are the chances that Hutus widely but simplistically viewed as perpetrators remember the genocide in a publicly sanctioned ways?

Historical Context

Rwanda is a country with a unique identity whose identity has been a combination of outside influence from explorers, colonizers, as well as the political and economic structure of the Rwanda society.\textsuperscript{9} Rwanda has three main communities within its boundaries. The majority are the Hutu, who accounts for 85 percent of the total population, Tutsis are about 14 percent, and the rest is the pygmy people otherwise called the Batwa.\textsuperscript{10} In recent times, the Kagame-led Rwandan government has attempted to eliminate ethnic identities.\textsuperscript{11}

Before Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Tutsis controlled the monarchy and had access to the political power of the country. Tutsis were considered superior to the Hutus because they had “European features” such as long noses and fairer skins. However, this assertion was pseudo-scientific since Rwandan identity and the ability to become Tutsi or Hutu was socially constructed. A Hutu could become Tutsi if he had a certain number of cows and a poor Tutsi could become Hutu. Determining whether one was Hutu or Tutsi was also problematic in cases of intermarriages. Both Hutus and Tutsis speak the same language, share the same culture, and they have lived together for thousands of years. Sadly, during the genocide, the differences between the two groups were pronounced than their similarities.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{9} Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) pg.29-31
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid pg 31
Some scholars have argued that the Hutu and Tutsis identities are socio-economic rather than ethnic.\textsuperscript{13} Rwandan oral history and family ties reveal that the terms Hutu and Tutsi would be flexible and dynamic before the German and Belgian colonization. A substantial number of Rwandans were agriculturalists with a small number of cows. Over time, the pastoralists acquired more power and begun to see themselves as superior to the crop planters.\textsuperscript{14} The Tutsi identity was determined by how much wealth one had. The identification of whether one was Tutsi or Hutu was not fixed and would change depending on geography, marriage, or newly acquired wealth.\textsuperscript{15}

The Batwa are the original inhabitants of Rwanda. The Hutu settled after the Batwa from the south, approximately two thousand years ago. The Hutu are members of the larger Bantu group that is prominent in the southern half of the African continent. Tutsis arrived last, and some historians argue that Tutsis were from the Horn of Africa and settled peacefully around the 15\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{16} When the colonists and explorers arrived in Rwanda, they met a sophisticated and well-organized political structure. Influenced by racism, the Europeans concluded that the Rwandan monarchy was not of Bantu origin.\textsuperscript{17} The explorers hypothesized that the Tutsi were runaway Caucasians and would rank under the Europeans but above the Hutus. The Batwa were the lowest class. The implication of this arrangement was the racial separateness of the Hutus and the Tutsis. In total disregard of the language and the shared culture, the Europeans subjugated the Hutus and redefined the monarchy according to racialized classifications.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Alison Des Forges, \textit{Leave None to Tell the Story} (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) pg. 33
\item \textsuperscript{14} Alison Des Forges, \textit{Leave None to Tell the Story} (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) pg. 31
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid, pg.64
\item \textsuperscript{17} Alison Des Forges, \textit{Leave None to Tell the Story} (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) pg. 42
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ian Law, \textit{“Racism and Ethnicity: Global Debates, Dilemmas, Directions”} (New York: Pearson Education Limited, 2010)pg. 84-86
\end{itemize}
John Speke, the European explorer who discovered the source of the Nile, developed a theory called the Hamitic Theory. Amongst other things, Speke’s theory holds that the Hamites came from the Middle East, moved to Ethiopia as Galla Hamites, passed through Uganda as Hima and settled in Rwanda and Burundi as Tutsi. The subsequent anthropologists would use this theory with many agreeing, “the Hamites were not Negroes, they were more intelligent than other African even as they were physically more attractive.”

Rwandans were taught these theories in school as they were taught how to read and write.

The Hamitic Theory was influential in setting the stage for the Rwandan genocide. Many Rwandans held the view that Tutsis were intelligent, cunning, and better looking and that Hutus were uncivilized, undereducated and emotional. According to Africanist Gerard Prunier, *Africa’s World War, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, the Rwandan genocide was a function of “precolonial culture of Rwanda, and the manic cultural re-engineering of the Belgian colonial authorities.” It is undeniable that such strong feelings of bigotry exercised toward Hutus by the Belgians and Tutsis created a sense of discontent, xenophobia, and hate. The final post-colonial solution would be the overall extermination of the Tutsi populace in Rwanda.

**Background on Rwandan Genocide**

For this thesis, I examine what is remembered about the Rwandan civil war and genocide, a genocide that was later renamed the “Tutsi genocide” by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led government. Before the genocide, Rwanda was already in the middle of a conflict; on one side was the Habyarimana government (Rwandan National Army) against the RPF. The Rwandan National Army fought for an

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extremist Hutu government. In 1973, a coup ousted the first post-colonial leader Gregoire Kayibanda leading to the establishment of the second Republic under President Juvenal Habiryamana.\textsuperscript{23} Kayibanda was a southern Hutu while Habiryamana was a northern Hutu. In 1975, President Habyarimana formed the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRMDD). President Habyarimana changed the party’s name to National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD) in 1991.\textsuperscript{24} NRMD was a party that was mainly composed of northern Hutus. NRMD grew excessively radicalized in the early 1990s after the push for democratization had garnered roots in Rwanda. As the push for democratization intensified, President Habyarimana governed through a small and powerful group of Hutus from Northern Rwanda called the “Akazu” meaning “small house” in Kinyarwanda. Led by Madame Agathe, Habyarimana’s wife, the Akazu made crucial decisions that affected the country. It is believed that the Akazu was responsible for the planning and the execution of the genocide as a means of persevering Hutu power, and specifically the Akazu’s control of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{25}

The children of Tutsi refugees that had fled Uganda shortly after Rwanda’s independence formed RPF, NRMD’s rivals.\textsuperscript{26} After independence in 1962, the Hutu majority government expelled Tutsis from Rwanda, and many Tutsis settled in Uganda.\textsuperscript{27} Because of persecutions in Uganda, the children of the Tutsis in Uganda re-emerged as a rebel army supported by the Ugandan government under President Yoweri Museveni.\textsuperscript{28} Museveni is from the Ankole tribe, which is a small ethnic group within the wider Banyarwaanda ethnic affiliation found in southwestern Uganda. The Banyankole have historical and

\textsuperscript{24} Alexander Laban, Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representation (Durham [NC: Duke University Press, 2009) pg. 92
\textsuperscript{28} Sadananda Sahoo and Pattanaik, Global Diasporas and Development: Socioeconomic, Cultural, and Policy Perspectives. pg.294
cultural roots in pre-colonial Rwandan kingdom. The Tutsis had fought for Museveni as frontline members of Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) that captured Kampala in the mid-eighties. Paul Kagame, who was to emerge as the leader of RPF, was a leading member of the Ugandan army by the time he joined the RPF.

For three and half years, Rwanda was consumed by a war that started with the invasion of Ugandan troops at the northeastern border of Rwanda and Uganda in October 1990. International pressure on the leadership of the Rwandan president of Hutu origin, President Habyarimana, led to a ceasefire in 1993 with a road map to implement the Arusha Accords that were negotiation agreements signed in the Tanzanian city of Arusha. The Arusha Accords created a power-sharing agreement with RPF. The agreement did not please any of the parties, and the ceasefire never materialized.

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprian Ntaryamira was shot down in Kigali. Genocidal killings targeting Tutsis and moderate Hutus began the next day. The RPF, under the leadership of Paul Kagame, put an end to the genocide when the rebel forces marched from Northern Rwanda into Kigali on July 4, 1994. The RPF took power on July 19, 1994. Two million Hutus crossed over to Congo to escape the violence in Rwanda, some of the fleeing Hutus were extremists that feared captor by the RPF. After taking power, the RPF invaded the Democratic Republic of the Congo to oust President Mobutu, who was sympathetic to Hutu hardliners. The war sparked a

29 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pg.23
30 Hazel Cameron, Britain's Hidden Role in the Rwandan Genocide: The Cat's Paw (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013) pg.34
refugee crisis that led to the death of over 4 million civilians. The war caused instability in Eastern Congo that is ongoing to this day.\textsuperscript{36}

The RPF’s invasion of Rwanda in the early 1990s was a critical aspect of the genocide in 1994. First, it militarized the Rwandan society in readiness for an external attack. While the rebels were of Rwandan origin, the fact that they were mainly Tutsis allowed the extremists in NRMD to exploit Rwandan history to their advantage. Being collaborators with the colonial regimes, the Tutsi’s had been widely viewed as beneficiaries of the colonial project. Also, the idea of Tutsi supremacy had generated Hutu nationalism based on Hutu power. According to Hutu nationalists, since Rwanda was a black majority country, then it had to be ruled by the majority Hutu. \textsuperscript{37} Secondly, whereas Hutus were killed as individuals, Tutsis were killed as a group.\textsuperscript{38} The RPF invasion defined the enemy making the Rwandan genocide a genocide by “those who saw themselves as natives and their mission as one of purifying and clearing their land from the invasive aliens.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Scope of the Research}

It is conceivable to question the memory of the genocide as well as of the Rwandan civil war. According to Alexandre Dauge-Roth, a memory media expert, documentation of horrors that people commit against one another is ill advised if that particular documentation or memorialization either does not address the ethical dimension of remembering or does not influence the society in a way that generates awareness and respect in present actions.\textsuperscript{40} Symbolic acts of remembering have social and political implications. While the act of remembering is “uneasy and disturbing quest for justice,”\textsuperscript{41} collective and political mediation of

\textsuperscript{36}Robin Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa: From Tragedy to Useful Imperial Fiction (Montreal, Baraka Books, 2013) p.212
\textsuperscript{37}Elizabeth Obadina, “Hutus and Tutsis: Genocide in Rwanda.” In Ethnic Groups in Africa (Broomall, PA: Mason Crest, 2014) chapter 5
\textsuperscript{38}Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2014) pg.5
\textsuperscript{39}Ibid, pg. 5
\textsuperscript{40}Alexandre Roth, Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2010) pg. 5
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid, pg. 5
the past constitutes a selective revision of what is worth remembering. Even as memory documents realize a re-examination of the past within the present, it does so at the expense of other memories, therefore silencing dissenting voices and institutionalizing forgetting of some aspects of memory.

Consequently, instead of reducing violence into distinct categories such as civil war, genocide, and RPF surge to eliminate reorganizing Hutu rebels, an understanding of Rwanda’s political dynamics requires coming to terms with the culture of violence from the early 1990s to the turn of the century. Rwanda was a “continuum of violence” and the genocide was the utmost peak of that Rwandan genocide cycle. After the genocide, RPF continued with an excess of violence by pursuing returning Hutu refugees in Northwestern Rwanda. From this vantage point, the study examines memory within the “continuum of violence” about Rwanda.

What Is to Follow

This study argues that private memories of the Hutu possibly do not compliment the public memory of the Rwandan genocide. Evidence from the public memory suggests a possible misalignment with personal accounts of Hutus based in the United States. Therefore, the conventional memory of the Rwandan genocide maintains, at least implicitly, the ethnic divisionism and significance of Tutsi memories over Hutus who died or were affected by the genocide. This memory study suggests that true reconciliation in Rwanda is perhaps impractical unless there is a shared understanding of what happened. Currently, the RPF monopolizes public memory for purposes of power preservation.

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42 Ibid, pg. 6
43 Alexandre Roth, Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2010) pg. 6
The second chapter is an exploration of literature on memory. While the first section of the literature review lays the groundwork for a study of both public and private memories, the second part of the uses the research on memory to explore the Rwandan genocide. The third chapter examines public memory that includes aspects of memory that are in public domain. An important part of public memory is the media. This thesis’ definition of media memory borrows from the work of Motti Neigar, an Israeli communications and memory scholar who reasons that media memory is the “the systematic exploration of collective pasts that are narrated by the media, through the use of the press and about the media.”

Media memory solicits from the work of Maurice Halbwach, who argues that collective memories stand for “tools through which several groups establish centrality in individual lives.” In this thesis, media memory exclusively discusses multimedia that includes television, film, and cinema. This thesis categorizes newspapers and magazines as the press. As such, when I discuss media houses such as the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor or The Guardian, I classify them as the press.

The fourth chapter discusses individual memories that focus on personal recollections about the genocide. The first part is individuals whose memories are in public domain. This category includes analysis of individual books and private accounts generated from media interviews. Nevertheless, the second part is wholly private memories of self-identified Rwandan Hutus in the United States. The second section of the fourth chapter utilizes memories of ten Rwandans. In cases where testimonies overlap, individual quotes are not used. I argue that genocide memorials, although exercised as means of expressing shared griefs, construct the meaning of the past atrocities. At the same time, because of the power of the discourse exhibited by the existence of the government’s conventional narratives, many Rwandans, primarily Hutus, are denied the opportunities to mourn their dead.

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The final chapter reiterates the arguments already laid out on the theory and literature as well as the finding sections. Based on the lukewarm reception of the reconciliation process in Rwanda as stated by my respondents, I ask if the conventional public memory of the Rwandan genocide is a half-accepted, top-down, emotionless, untrustworthy spread of half of the truths? Is the public memory an agent of repression and lack of connection with individual accounts? I consider the voices of Rwandan Hutus in the United States as a great place to start this conversation. Also, the more these voices are raised, the more the complexities of the Rwandan genocide emerge. Currently, courtesy of this study, Rwanda’s supposed reconciliation is perchance only a façade.
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Methodology

As scholars analyze acts of public memories of tragic events such as the Rwandan genocide, scholars combat the effects of politics in the process of remembrance. In the Rwandan case, about the genocide of 1994, there must be an acknowledgment that all victims and survivors deserve respect. An inclusive memory of the tragic events is paramount for reconciliation and the abatement of future conflicts. This literature review examines the complexities in public memory vis-à-vis the Rwandan genocide in contrast with individual/private memory. Is there a possibility of a misalignment between the public and personal memory of Rwandans, particularly the Hutus about the genocide of 1994? To answer this question, I examine the literature that highlights the complexity of genocide memory in Rwanda even as this research add Hutu memories in genocidal scholarship. The general takeaways from the literature include the following. First, individualized accounts create personalized ways in which the past is represented that accommodates complexities of those tragic events. Second, memory in the public domain is mediated, but that mediated account is permanently imprinted on the minds of the people. Logically, an examination of the private and public memory is required for a comprehensive reconciliation to occur in such divided societies.

Firstly, this literature review analyzes the concepts of memory from various fields of study with the aim of finding what is out there regarding private and public memory. The second section of the literature review examines theories of memory while the third segment explores research on the public memory of Rwandan genocide in contrast with the individual accounts. An assessment of how the reconciliation process has affected remembering the genocide comes in the fourth section. The fifth part explores the memories of Hutus in the diaspora. In the final part, this chapter briefly analyzes the literature and documents limitations of the study.
For purposes of this research, Paul Ricoeur work is useful because it incorporates ideas from many other scholars in a holistic frame. According to Ricoeur, memory conventionally refers to personal recollections of events; such memory is defined by the individual’s relationship with the larger society. Public memory sometimes defies personal recollections of events. To illustrate this concept, one can ask why certain historical events such as Holocaust are prominent in our collective consciousness, but some events such as the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua are distant in public memory? Similarly in Rwanda, the massacre of the Tutsis in 1994 is more prominent in the public domain, but less famous is deaths of Hutus before and after the genocide. Ricoeur's Memory, History, Forgetting delves deeper into this association highlighting how politics, power, victor’s justice, and the moral deliberations often shape the public perception of historical events. However, is it possible that memory over-remembers some events at the expense of others? I utilize Ricoeur’s work even as I supplement his work with other equally viable publications from other memory scholars.

Background to Memory Theory

The literature on memory is vast, with different articulations from one aspect of memory to another and from one discipline to another. Each aspect of memory has salient characteristics. Memory is understood in many ways, and so finding a working definition for memory is a daunting task. Still, an exploration of how different scholars document memory is helpful towards the realization of an accepted conceptualization of memory. Perhaps conventional knowledge about memory stems from human psychology. Memory defines personhood highlighting the uniqueness of one person from another. When

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51 Astrid Erll, A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010)pg.1
people hear the word memory, they associate it with an event they attended or people they met in past. However, in addition to defining individual existence, memory has a social role that shapes a sense of group identity acquired from shared experiences.\(^5\) Possibly, memory’s importance explains why it is widely researched. The individual aspect of memory is, in the words of Barbara Craig, “a place where information and knowledge (is) stored or from which ideas, concepts, and knowledge are recalled.”\(^5\) The promise of memory is that, by including information in public places, people will be able to remember events similarly. However, the major flaw in that logic is that in some cases, individual memory parallels public memory, thereby making public memory less representative of individual accounts.

The study of memory is not new. Western scholarship argues that the Greeks were the first recorded people to document investigations on remembering, in many respects this is false. The Egyptians, as well as other civilizations in the Nile Valley of Africa, were perhaps the first recognized civilizations to undertake public memory of the dead by erecting massive pyramids. These ancient memories of the dead are still present and are one of the “seven wonders of the ancient world.”\(^5\) Equally, in West Africa, the griots of Malinke Empire, which stretched from modern-day Senegal to Mali, preserved the memory of the empire by memorizing laws, traditions, and decrees and names of kings. They have passed these memories for seven centuries with little distortions.\(^5\) African classical scholar Cheikh Diop has pointed out that these West African empires acquired the practices of historical preservation from ancient Egyptians.\(^5\) It is important to recognize that these monuments represent memory as seen in public. It is impossible for the present generations to have an accurate memory of individuals who lived in old Egypt or the Malian empire.

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While public memory as exemplified by the pyramids is mostly depicted through monuments, in classical Europe, Aristotle, one of the most famous Greek philosophers, published an article in which he attempted to describe the functionality of human memory. Aristotle argued that memory “existence and perception” shapes memory.\(^{57}\) Plato also wrote about memory arguing, “We hold to wax to perceptions and thoughts, and in that receive the impressions of them.”\(^{58}\) While Plato’s ideas of mental impressions are still widely useful in the discourse of memory, scholars today reckon that human memory is dynamic and not static.\(^ {59}\) As the study of memory progressed, many other scholars diversified the study from being purely a scientific research area, to being more inclusive of other academic disciplines. Today, scholars agree that while definitions are useful, they can never fully capture the complexities of remembering. Within various disciplines, definitions of memory vary. Memory is interchangeably defined depending on the adjective preceding it. Such adjectives come from the community, individuals, or public amongst others. The adjectives set the limits on the kind of memory under discussion. For the remainder of this discussion, I will restrict the analysis of memory to public memory and private memory because of the spectrum of the research.

In 1932, Fredrick Bartlett published a groundbreaking article titled “Remembering.” Unlike other previous memory scholars, Bartlett suggests that memory is not just the revival of events from some storage space, but it is an entirely new process in its right. Bartlett argues that memory employs existing “structures of knowledge” to help in the course of reforming the original recollections.\(^ {60}\) Consequently, our attitudes, expectations, beliefs and levels of motivation will influence the way we remember. Bartlett’s ideas regarding memory had far-reaching consequences in the distinction between what the public remembers about specific events, versus what an individual can remember the same event.

\(^{57}\) David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism, (Leiden: Brill, 2007). pg.xii
\(^{58}\) David Moxon, Memory (Oxford: Heinemann, 2000) pg.3
\(^{60}\) Frederic Bartlett, Remembering; a Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, (New York: Macmillan; 1932) pg11.
Bartlett’s assessment of memory compliments Paul Ricœur’s work. In the book *Memory, History and Forgetting*, Ricœur observes that in everyday discourse, memory attributes to one person; for example, one can say “my memory of a given event,” which implies a personal account. Personal memory is a private memory attributed to a single person.\(^6^1\)

**Private Memory vs. Public Memory**

Private memory, if not included in the public account, is subject to passing irrevocably with the death of the individual for whom that memory constituted a lived experience. Compared to public memory, private or personal memory is not permanent, and thus subject to diminishing value, caused by the death of an individual.\(^6^2\) A community often shares public memory, and this elevates public memory to a commanding position since it exceeds and transcends the life of an individual. The contrasting relationship between public and private memory works in a complex relationship that is a subject of context and public perception. Pierre Naquet’s *Assassins of Memory: Essays in the Denial of the Holocaust*\(^6^3\) and Deborah Lipstadt’s *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*\(^6^4\) document the palpable tension between public and private memory. These books illustrate prejudices embodied in genocide denial that refuse to come to terms with the lived experience of Holocaust survivors. In doing so, the authors testify to the often adversarial relationship between personal experience and public memory.

Although Pierre Naquet and Deborah Lipsdat have discussed the contrasting relationship between public and private memory, Edward Casey, in *Public Memory in Place and Time*, claims that public memory is

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\(^6^4\) Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. (New York, 2006).
distinct from other forms of memory, thereby offering perhaps one of the clearest differences between public memory and private memory. Public memory refers to the act of viewing or reading by the public, but mostly it means to be “understood right away, without hesitation or interpretation, in its basic significance.” While individual memories are usually from the past, public memory is often a combination of the past and the present. Public memory remembers the past but ensures that the history is unforgotten in the future. Monuments are examples of manifestations of public memories. Monuments are massive, which means that they embody a futuristic element while at the same time recognize the history of the event with written inscriptions, dates, and statements, such as “we shall never forget” acting as a connection between the past and the future. By nature of its design, public memory lasts longer than private memory. In reverse, individual memory refers to the personalization of remembrance. Individual memory promotes a great deal of lived experience, often remembered in particular ways and distinct from the recollection of the public or the community. The individual recollection is rich in details and complexities and often juxtaposes public memory if there is a clash of interest with public memory.

Whereas Bartlett provides a well-researched scientific study of memory, and Naquet and Lipstadt work on the complexities of public and private memory, Casey provides ample evidence suggesting the supremacy of public memory over private memory. Paul Ricœur’s theory of memory offers a connection between public and private memory. Ricœur demonstrates that the process of remembering is critical to the perception of historical experience and the production of a historical narrative by the state. A historical narrative is possible because memory accrues from a gathering of previous events recalled repeatedly, the bygones continue in the present because information regarding these older events passes on in books, museums, commemorations amongst other repositories and outlets. However, the presence of one public memory does not imply the existence of only one memory. Individuals within a group do not necessarily share the same memory. Younger generations do not have the firsthand account of past

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65 Edward, Casey "Public Memory in Place and Time." In Framing Public Memory (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004) pg. 17
66 Edward, Casey "Public Memory in Place and Time." In Framing Public Memory (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004) pg. 21
events that took place before they were born. By controlling a historical narrative, a state can socially construct its memory based on its agenda for the future generations.

As I have observed in the preceding paragraphs, Ricœur’s work is central to this thesis. Yves Charles Zarka further explores the conclusions of Ricœur in the article, “The Construction of Historical Consciousness.” Zarka argues that individual memory loses its substance after a lifetime unless that memory becomes documented in a memoir or stored electronically. Also, there is a possibility that distance and time from a historical event may affect how an individual remembers a particular event. If the memory is not “lived,” then the memory of the subsequent generations get distortions since the individuals, lack reliable sources of information. In this case, memory will emanate from emotions instead of facts and influenced by personal biases and perceptions.67 In such situations, it will not be uncommon for individuals and groups modify past events to help in the formation of a new understanding of the history in connection to the present reality.

Theory of Memory in the Rwandan Genocide

In the above literature, I have explored how the study of memory has developed over time. I have also focused on the distinctions between public memory and private memory. Also, I have written about memory as influenced by distance and time. The following paragraphs will explore the memory literature concerning the Rwandan genocide in particular. I focus on the memory of the Rwandan genocide because it is important to examine what and how scholars have written about the memory and the genocide. By surveying literature, I seek to see what is missing in the literature.

In Public Memory, Public Media and Politics of Justice, modern language scholar and communication expert Philip Lee, argues that post-genocidal Rwanda has strict limits on who and what qualifies for

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public remembrance. The Rwandan genocide is a case of “deconstructed discourse,” with accepted ways in which people talk, think, and memorize the genocide. Some events are valued or devalued, and ones that are excluded in commemorative speeches and testimonies. After the genocide, the conventional “perpetrators”, mostly Hutus, prefer to avoid remembering the genocide partly because of denial of guilt or, because of regret. On the other hand, “survivors cannot forget.” The genocide became a definitive phenomenon for their existence. In private spaces, individual memories dialogue with the past and the representation of history in the public sphere, therefore making memory a socially dynamic experience. In the words of Johan Pottier, writer of the book Re-imagining Rwanda, “the horror of 1994 Rwandan genocide must never be forgotten, but if reconciliation is to take place in Rwanda, then a broader, more detailed and historically informed contextualization of the drama is required.” Within the political nature of genocide memorialization, the Rwandan state has possibly attempted to produce a singularly accepted account about the genocide with limited success. Individual accounts, especially survivors, grapple with the sufferings of the past. These past traumatic experiences demonstrate dissonance between public memory and individual memory.

As Ricoeur have noted, a historical narrative is possible because memory ensues from public spaces. The Rwandan genocide provides a case where the government has used public memory, such as national mourning in April, officially known as “Kwibuka” in Kinyarwanda, for remembering. However, the public commemoration initiated by the government has garnered criticism for its one-sidedness.

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70 Ibid, Pg. 100
71 Ibid, Pg. 100-102
72 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
Numerous Tutsi survivors remain discontented with the space granted for their memories. Hutu survivors’ experiences, suffering, traumatic legacies, and personal details, are still influential memories nonetheless absent from public spaces such as the Genocide Museum in Kigali. Memory in public, demonstrated by the genocide flame, symbolizes only the genocide that is only one aspect of the Rwandan conflict. The genocide flame is a torch of fire used to commemorate the genocide. The skeletons of genocide victims and the commemorations in April are a function of discourse that marks political boundary lines between survivors and perceived perpetrators. Public memory redefines lines of exclusion and inclusion on what it means to be a victim or a perpetrator of the genocide of 1994 as well as acknowledging of an existence of only one narrative of the tragedy while undermining some victims.

While there is space recognizing the active role of some Rwandans, particularly Hutus, in stopping the genocide, this space is not exhaustive. The treatment of Paul Rusesabagina, hero of the movie Hotel Rwanda exemplifies this shrinking space. Rusesabagina has a “self-promotion agenda while distorting Rwanda’s history and spreading negative propaganda” charge leveled on him by Rwandan authorities. The reasons for Rusasebegina’s charges are political rather than criminal. I discuss these issues in the in the chapter of individual memories. The way Rwandan history is taught in civics classrooms also demonstrates the limited remembrance of the Hutu side of the story. Elizabeth King, a Rwandan genocide scholar, notes that history and civics textbooks only focus on the genocide, especially the attempt to exterminate Tutsi minority by extremists Hutus. Nonetheless, the textbooks are silent on the violent

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experiences of the Hutus before the genocide. The texts also do not mention revenge killings of unarmed Hutus by the Tutsi soldiers after the genocide.  

In addition to limiting the memorial spaces in classrooms, the government led by President Paul Kagame has officially eliminated social discourse on the use of ethnic identities – Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. While the removal of social identities has been an attempt at silencing the discord arising from historical injustices and shaping a new Rwandan identity, the commemorations that usually occur in the month of April are important in the formation of a one-sided -Tutsi influenced- narrative about the Rwandan genocide that Ricoeur describes as “social construction of memory.” The public remembrance of the victims of the genocide is considered a national duty of every citizen as well as an important direction towards the formation of a “one Rwanda” identity.  

In 2014 commemorations, the country marked the twentieth anniversary of the genocide. In his address to the nation, President Kagame thanked his compatriots and women for their contributions to nation building and emphasized “historical truth” as a memory requirement. President Kagame said, “Historical clarity is a duty of memory that we cannot escape… there is a story whose truth must be told in full, no matter how uncomfortable.”

President Kagame’s words hint at a shared understanding of the Rwandan genocide as a genocide against the Tutsi. However, as Urzula Rog asked in her article Commemorating Genocide- An Important Element of the Politics of Memory in Rwanda, “In light of President Kagame’s words, a question of whether the memory of genocide is shared by all Rwandans arise?” It is reasonable to think that the memory of the

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Hutu and Tutsi is conflicting. Still, Kagame’s take is selective in the memory of the genocide and sweeps the differences under the carpet.

Philip Gourevitch is one of the most acclaimed writers about the genocide. In his book, We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow We Will be Killed with our Families, wrote, “Rwandan history is dangerous…it is a record of successive struggles for power, and to an enormous extent, power consists in the ability to make others inhabit your story.” The memory of genocide among Hutus is necessary, highlighted by a leading Rwandan scholar Gerrard Prunier, who described the current public memory of the genocide as “Tutsification of the genocide.” One key challenge is that the narrative of the genocide depends on group identity, in particular on the question “who are you?” If Hutu, the judgment would be the perpetrator, and Tutsi is synonymous with the victim while Twa with a bystander. Of concern is that the teaching of history is missing in many schools, and the memory of the genocide is increasingly becoming political. In 2008, the Rwandan government renamed the genocide “The Genocide against the Tutsi.” The renaming of the genocide as a Tutsi genocide locks out the experiences of many Hutu survivors and victims.

Gerrard Prunier admits that the Rwandan genocide was “complex” because it occurred in a “tightly knit community.” Hutus who went out of their way to help the victims could be arrested for not helping. President Kagame’s RPF gets credits for stopping the genocide, but Prunier writes that they also committed mass murder of Hutus. However, Hutu cabinet ministers in RPF did not cry foul for these

83 Philip Gourevitch, We wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1999), pg. 48
85 Jennie Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), pg. 8
86 Philip Gourevitch. "Remembering in Rwanda" (The New Yorker, April 21, 2014).
88 Robin Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa: From Tragedy to Useful Imperial Fiction (Baraka Books, 2013)pg. 76
actions. Jennie Burnet, the author of *Genocide Lives in Us*, argues that the summer of 1994 was a time of extreme violence that targeted the Tutsi segment of the Rwandan populace. Violence was the order of the day for almost the entire decade of the 1990s in the country of Rwanda. While it is recognized that not all Rwandans are genocide survivors, almost all Rwandans lost loved ones in the genocide of 1994, the Civil War of (1990-1994). Rwandans also lost lives in the refugee camps of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (1994-1997), and in the insurgency against Hutu extremists in North Western Rwanda (1997-2001). All Rwandan people, from all Rwandan ethnicities- Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa- have violent pasts that they have to remember. Still, the memory of the genocide is politically one-sided and does not factor in the sufferings of many non-Tutsi victims hence highlighting Ricœur’s argument that memory is possibly subjective, but powerful if it acquires political power.

By acknowledging and remembering only a select case of memories of violence, the government fails to address the tensions arising from ethnic identities that are present in the discourse about genocide. According to Burnet, “the politics of memory in Rwanda today are intimately connected to questions of identity.” The Rwandan population observes remembering the genocide as an assertion of an individual’s being. In microsocial settings, remembrance of the genocide becomes less problematic because there are a possibility and freedom of being distant from the larger historical, cultural and political narratives. Individual memories do not necessarily lead to a production of categories or a group narrative except in unique circumstances. Memories, in such cases, contradict the experience, therefore

questioning the notions of identity. However, for most Rwandans in public or semi-public settings, remembering is a political act.”

Because remembering is a political act in Rwanda, it influences the success of the reconciliation process. Urzula Rog, a peace and conflict resolution expert, reasons that the position taken by President Kagame impedes reconciliation. Kagame’s approach focuses on a public memory that sanctions some individual experiences. Rog writes that it is important that the memory of the Rwandan genocide come from the official version of the genocide and the memories of both perpetrators and victims. Finding a balance between what should be remembered and what should be forgotten is a crucial requirement for the process of reconciliation to surge ahead.

Other writers, such as Rebecka Tact, share such an account. Tact’s essay argues that the silencing of the atrocities committed against Hutus by the Rwanda Patriotic Front in the Democratic Republic of Congo be indicative of what others have defined as “collective instruction.” Collective instruction is a state-centered approach on memory supported by legal mechanisms and includes the establishment of a particular narrative about events while sanctioning memories that might generate dissent. The instructive memory imposes official memory that “rules out a recognition of the ambivalence of the notion of guilt.” Symbolic acts of remembering have social and political implications. While the act of remembering should be understood as the “uneasy and disturbing quest for justice,” collective and

94 Ibid, pg. 8
99 Ibid, pg. 5
political mediation of the past, constitute a selective revision of what is worth remembering.\textsuperscript{100} Even as memory documents and realizes a re-examination of the past within the present, it does so at the expense of other memories, therefore silencing dissenting voices and institutionalizing forgetting of some aspects of memory.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{Reconciliation and Peacebuilding}

Susan Thomson, writing in \textit{Whispering Truth to Power}, exposes how President Kagame’s attempt at national reconciliation controls the state but does not forge genuine reconciliation. Thomson’s work demonstrates the inadequate support of the government’s attempt at reconciliation from rural Rwandans. According to Thomson, reconciliation as practiced today shapes Rwandan history in a manner that the state sees fit. Individuals who undertake reconciliation often misuse that power to advance particular interests, usually directing the genocide stories. Second, the reconciliation process in Rwanda has class undertones whereby the peasants exhibit a high sense of alienation from the English speaking elites.\textsuperscript{102} The official position of the government on reconciliation is distinct from the realities on the ground. Also, the government’s policy approaches “post-genocide justice on the presumption of a criminal (adult male Hutu) population is a useful mechanism that the RPF strategically deploys to control political opponents, deflect criticism of its actions during the genocide, and justify its military presence in D.R. Congo.”\textsuperscript{103} Thus, the meanings of personal pain and trauma are indistinguishable from public memory created by literary work in the press, media and other available documents in public spaces.\textsuperscript{104}

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{100} Ibid, pg. 6
\bibitem{101} Alexandre Roth, \textit{Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History} (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2010) pg. 6
\bibitem{104} Alexandre Roth, \textit{Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History} (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2010) pg.26
\end{thebibliography}
About Rwanda’s future, Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan political scientist and author of the book *When Victims become Killers* questions the possibility of building a society that can embrace all the survivors while consoling the aggrieved and a fearful minority. Even though the Tutsi in Rwanda today will hope for “never again,” the Hutus will be better off with a political solution that recognizes democratic ideals and human rights. “If the postcolonial pursuit of justice turned into revenge and built on the colonial legacy, one needs to be aware lest post-genocidal reconciliation also turns into an embrace of the colonial legacy.”105 For the sake of Rwanda, and for the Tutsi minority to leave in peace, Rwanda will have to reconcile.

Rather than think that power is the precondition for survival, the Tutsi will sooner or later have to consider the opposite possibility: that the prerequisite to cohabitation, to reconciliation, and a common political future may indeed be to give up the monopoly of power. So long as Hutu and Tutsi remain alive as political identities, giving up political power may be a surer guarantee of survival than holding on to it. 106

Mamdani hints at the apex of the Rwandan paradox where the pursuit of democracy for the Hutu majority infers a Trojan horse for another genocide against the Tutsis. On the other hand, the search for blind justice by a Tutsi regime is a vessel of the tyranny of the minority. A careful balancing act is required.

Easter Marijen and Jar Van der Lijn capture Thomson and Mamdani’s worries about Rwanda’s reconciliation process. In the article, “Rwanda 2025: Scenarios for the Future Political Stability of Rwanda,” Marijen & Van der Lijn argue that Rwanda’s political future is troublesome because of the lack of democratization in the country.107 Marijen & Van der Lijn reason that the overemphasis on authoritarianism over democratization embeds the culture of political repression that is not only distracting free speech but also impedes political discussion that is critical for the promotion of human rights. Similarly, Fred Cowell, in “Participatory Rights in Rwanda,

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107 Rachel Ibrek, “A Time of Mourning: The Politics of Commemorating Tutsi-Genocide in Rwanda” pg 100
Genocide Ideology Laws and the Future Political Space” writes that presently Rwanda has a set of laws designed to constrict civil and political rights, however, this is an ongoing human rights abuse since it allows only the state to control memory spaces. The consequence of the state power is an “insider-outsider” dynamic that places the government as the only authority determining the future of Rwanda.\(^\text{108}\) Such an arrangement has the possibility of generating dissent that could destabilize the country in the future.

Though I have explored several scholars of memory, Ricœur offers a formidable theory that explains Rwandan government’s insistence on particular methods of memorializing the genocide. The intentional “public rewriting” of memory is a wider government plan to unite the country but has created a new narrative that provides legitimacy for the government since it is a Tutsi minority government that generates resentment from many Hutus. The narrative of “one Rwanda” helps the government with legitimacy\(^\text{109}\) because memory plays a central role in the formation of identity at the individual (private memory) and the group level (memory in public spaces).\(^\text{110}\) This identity is not limited to the Rwandan territories, as it has influenced the Rwanda diasporic perception of their homeland.

\textit{Hutu Memory and the Diaspora}

The above section discussed memory and politics of Rwanda genocide highlighting the ongoing sanctioning memories of some victims in public. The following section will explore the literature of memories of Hutus in the diaspora as documented by other scholars. The genocide was not limited to Rwanda. Scholars have observed that that tragic event was the genesis of conflicts in the great lakes regions of Africa.\(^\text{111}\) The tragic events of 1994 in Rwanda had a “deterriorialization” consequence in the

\(^{108}\) Rachel Ibrek, “A Time of Mourning: The Politics of Commemorating Tutsi-Genocide in Rwanda” pg 100


\(^{110}\) Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History and Forgetting (Chicago, U.S: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p.g 82

The effect was a migration of people that scattered Rwandan nationals and Banyarwaanda (ethnic Rwandans but of different nationalities) throughout the world. The concept of ‘deterritorialization’ refers to the lessening of a nation-state’s control over its territory due to globalization, as well as conflict becoming ‘less localized’ as a consequence of it spilling across ways not previously possible. Crucially, other dynamics are also involved, influencing diaspora attitudes and actions toward their respective home countries. Deterritorialization provides reasons why migrant groups are increasingly becoming key players in the new patterns of political mobilization at home. Outside Rwanda, the genocide continues to define the identity of Rwandan’s in diaspora.

Claudine Kuradusenge, a Rwandan, writing in a blog post titled “Hutu Diaspora Narrative: Identity in Conflict, Conflict Identity,” argues that Hutus in the diaspora are negatively identified as perpetrators of the genocide. Kuradusenge contends that the classification of Hutus as perpetrators has instigated a nationalistic struggle among the Hutu community abroad to fight for freedom of the Hutus at home, and to distance the Hutu populace from the negative legacy of the genocide. This movement is also concerned about the rights of victimhood for many Hutus who not classified as survivors of the genocide. Hutu identity abroad, according to Kuradusenge, forms from not only what had been lost, but also socially constructed labels that continue to view the Hutus in the diaspora as perpetrators. Indeed, many Hutus see themselves as “stateless, unwanted, and damaged.” As a way of describing their condition, Hutus abroad use the word “surviving” as a depiction of their state. The resignation of Hutus has been a function of silenced voices at home and the global stage.

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115 Claudine Kuradusenge, "Peace, Democracy and Development Blog."

116 Ibid
While many Hutus agree that mass killings happened in Rwanda, they are not pleased with categorizing Hutus as sole perpetrators. Instead, according to Kuradusenge, Rwandans must reconcile that the country “experienced a double genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda.” The concept of double genocide sprang up after the Rwandan genocide started, leading to the premature conclusion that the Rwandan fiasco was an ethnic war. Fundamentally, the theory holds that Rwandan genocide of April 1994 targeted mainly Tutsis. However, before the genocide of 1994, the RPF had also killed approximately one million Hutus between 1990 and 1994. Still, the competing narratives about the genocide have shaped perceptions of the actual events and victimized the new generations of Rwandans that grew up in the aftermath.

While the allegations about the mass killings of Hutus are provable, I argue that they do not qualify as genocide because of two reasons. First, in the genocide of 1994, Tutsis died because of their ethnic identity. For this reason, Tutsi killings of 1994 qualify as genocidal. Second, Hutus died in large numbers both by RPF soldiers and by fellow Hutu extremists. Because of this complexity, it becomes difficult to qualify Hutu massacres as genocidal. However, many scholars acknowledge that a substantial number of Hutus lost their lives extra-judicially.

Hutus in the diaspora, including the United States, have been politically active with the intention of challenging the dominance of RPF. These political entities include IntwariPartnership, ADRN- Ighango, and Umubano among others. IntwariPartnership is a Hutu group formed in 2004 in Brussels by Emmanuel Habyarimana, a Hutu, who was a part of the RPF government before going into exile in 2003.

117 Claudine Kuradusenge, "Peace, Democracy and Development Blog."
119 Claudine Kuradusenge, "Peace, Democracy and Development Blog."
The co-founder was Déogratias Mushayidi, a Tutsi, who served as Secretary General and Spokesperson. The organization acts as a Hutu umbrella group that includes several other small foreign-based organizations that have formed an alliance called the ADRN-Igihango.\textsuperscript{121} The increasing political agitation from Rwandans in the diaspora is a consequence of the RPF policy of silencing dissent of narratives that challenge its moral position as the genocide stopper. Some accounts, on the other hand, view the RPF a genocide instigator or, in some cases, the perpetrator of the violence of the 1990s.

In the year 2001, a Pan-African online magazine, \textit{Rising Continent}, published a story titled, “Paul Kagame: 17 Years of Flawed Policy of Reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis.” The article documented the accounts of Rwandans in the diaspora who disappeared, extradited, or charged in absentia for opposing the RPF’s policy on reconciliation or its account of the genocide. The magazine documents the story of Prudentienne, a woman of mixed Hutu and Tutsi parentage. Prudentienne was a member of a community group called Umubano that was publicly remembering Hutu friends and relatives that lost their lives during the genocide and the civil war. The group organized a commemoration in the United Kingdom in the year 2006. Kigali accused them of being genocidaires.\textsuperscript{122}

Four months later, officials in the United Kingdom willingly extradited many of the genocidaires back to Rwanda of which four of the Umubano group were imprisoned. The article also writes the story of Victoria Ingabire Umuhoza, who was a leader of the FDU-Inkingi, an opposition party. Based in the Netherlands, Ingabire Umuhoza traveled from Amsterdam to Kigali to campaign for the presidential elections in Rwanda. During the campaign of 2011, Ingabire-Umuhoza publicly questioned the reason why Hutus who died during the genocide had no commemorations. In 2012, Mrs. Ingabire-Umohoza was


arrested and charged with genocide revisionism and inciting the public using “genocide ideology.”

The genocide ideology law is an ambiguous legislation that is subject to open-ended interpretation by the Rwandan government for purposes of clamping down on dissent. Article two of Law No: 18/2009 states that:

The genocide ideology is an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing (sic) on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war.

While the intent of the law is right, it is subject to misuse by RPF to send opposing politicians to jail for speaking out on RPF’s policies on genocidal memories.

Rwandan politics today necessarily deprives people of their memory. In his book, *We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow We shall be Killed by Our Families*, Philip Gourevitch, quotes President Kagame as grouping all the Hutus as killers. “Well, these Hutus killed, so they must be killed, and these Tutsis were the victims, so they must now get the better of what there is in this situation.” Kagame’s quote is, at best, vindictive of the entire Hutu population and it contrasts the accounts of many Hutu genocide survivors. Hutu diaspora survivors’ accounts point to the incompleteness of the state’s explanation of the genocide that has a consequence of shaping public memory.

Hutu genocide survivor, Marie-Beatrice Umutesi’s Surviving *the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire*, documents the torture, massacre and starvation of the Hutus found in areas captured by


126 Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998) pg. 316
RPF as they marched into Kigali in the year 1993. The RPF conquest of Kigali in July 1994 led to Hutus flight westwards towards the Democratic Republic of Congo. Likewise, when the genocide broke out, many moderate Hutus had fled from Rwandan to Congo to escape the violence or not to be influenced by the Hutu extremists. After the RPF had captured Kigali, many more Hutus walked, ran or marched in the jungles heading towards Congo. RPF soldiers consistently pursued the refugees, and when found would be killed, raped or dismembered without regard to whether they were extremists or not. The works of Hutu diaspora about the genocide support the sentiments expressed by Hutus about sanctioned memories in Rwanda. The influence of this literature is that it contradicts the assumption that there were no good Hutus. For example, Paul Rusasebegina’s role in Hotel Rwanda demonstrates that public memory of the genocide is incomplete. As observed in this literature review, a plethora of scholars has researched the Rwandan genocide. While numerous books have dealt with different facets of memories of that tragedy, few have examined the memory of diaspora Rwanda, precisely the Hutu subgroup. The lack of studies on the memories of the Hutu diaspora creates an impetus to research that aspect of the genocide. The aim of this project is to start filling the gap between public memories and private memories of Hutus in the United States.

Research Methodology

My methodology intended to retrieve two things critical for this study: first, the memories of individual Hutus in the United States and their accounts about the Rwandan genocide. The second task was researching the memorialization of the genocide in public places that include, but are not limited to the media, scholarly books, press, the Internet and Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C, for reasons of generating the patterns of genocide memory. The major part of this research focuses on public memory, relying on memory as depicted in public places aforementioned.

127 Robin Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa: From Tragedy to Useful Imperial Fiction (Baraka Books, 2013)pg.57
The research focuses on public memory due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. Many Rwandans avoid talking about the genocide for reasons that are both personal and political. In the Rwandan community, there is an overwhelming fear of the RPF government. My interviewees revealed that talking about the government could endanger the lives of loved ones who are still in Rwanda. However, I complimented public memories with individual stories of ten Hutu refugees in the United States who willingly shared their stories.

I relied on qualitative methods of data, specifically semi-structured questions to get the individual Hutu memories of the genocide. Semi-structured questions are open questions that give directions while allowing participants to divert from the question set if they wish to do so. This strategy was helpful since it allowed individuals to focus on things that they felt were most important to them. There were individual interviews conducted with participants in their locations of choice to collect data using semi-structured interviews. Participants took part in one-on-one interviews lasting between 20-40 minutes. 20-40 minutes is an approximate time length necessary for an in-depth conversation. One-on-one interviews gave the participants opportunities to distance themselves from the public and feel free to open up about their experiences during the genocide. I asked each participant general questions in conversations about his or her memories of the genocide. I also asked respondents to answer a set of open-ended questions that guided the conversation. The general questions catered to building rapport with each participant while the open-ended questions were specific to the research intention. I also took notes

131 Example of a semi-structured question: What do you think about healing and reconciliation in Rwanda?
during the interview. I kept the privacy of the individuals by the use of pseudonyms and locking up interview notes in a safe place after interviews. The interviews took place in restaurants, parks, and other public locations such as the Holocaust Museum and stadiums.

The study took place in Washington D.C. due to the proximity of the Holocaust Museum in the city that has critical documents about the Rwandan genocide. However, the study was not limited to one location as I did other interviews using the internet tools such as Skype, phone calls and emails to reach Rwandans in cities such as St. Louis, Dallas, New Jersey, and Denver. The documents from the Holocaust Museum were helpful for finding information on the public memories of the genocide. Critical to this research is the memory of the genocide as published by Rwandan government historians. I visited the Rwandan embassy to have access to their publications on the genocide. Washington D.C. has a substantial amount of Rwandans who live there. The criteria that I used to select participants were as follows: roughly an equal number of females and males of diverse ages during the genocide: varieties in incomes, levels of education, political involvements and durations of stay in the United States. Having diverse participants was critical for research validity because I was able to see if there were emerging patterns regarding the individual memory of the Rwandan genocide. I interviewed ten participants who witnessed, survived or were victims of the genocide. The diversity of participants was a top priority. I did not provide compensation for this research since I expected the participants to share their memories.

**Analysis of Data**

The analysis of the data draws from information gathered in the summer of 2015 from interviewees, as well as from observations and research done on the public memory of the Rwandan genocide available in the internet, genocide museum in Washington D.C, Rwandan textbooks, the genocide memorial days, and events in Rwanda. This study is based in the United States because, first, I live in the country, and second, because of the relatively freer political space for many Rwandans to speak their minds. In the analysis, I examine if there is a similarity between individual narratives of Hutus in the United States about the
genocide as compared to the publicly visible memory of that tragic event. If there are consistencies, then the analysis concludes that both the public memory and the individual memory are complimentary. However, if generalized memories of Hutus in the United States is not complimentary with public memory, then I will conclude that there is the minimization of individual memories.

Further analysis will explore the consequences of the outcome of the healing and reconciliation process in Rwanda. Although the study utilized account of only ten Hutus, it showed that Rwandan public memories do not complement individual narratives, in particular among some Hutus in the United States. This study This suggests a possible disconnect between public and private memory. A much more expansive study would be necessary for a more definitive conclusion. Similarly, the Rwandan government is attempting to create what Memory Scholar Edward Casey calls “a futuristic narrative” that defies the nuanced, lived experience of genocide survivors. This futuristic narrative is, according to Ricoeur, a “perception of historical experience.”

As observed by Paul Ricoeur, public memory is formed through individuals’ intersubjective association with others. This thesis develops an argument of undermined memories of the Rwandan genocide on the part of Hutus. Drawing from Ricoeur’s concept of an adversarial relationship between public and personal accounts, I argue that Ricoeur’s account provides a useful framework for understanding the dissonance between the dissimilarity of Hutu accounts compared to the conventional accounts of the genocide. Therefore, a dialogue exists between public and private spaces regarding the genocide. In public, many Rwandans accept public memory as informed by the accounts established by the victorious RPF. In private space, Rwandans, primarily Hutus, hold different recollections regarding the events of 1994. My goal is to demonstrate that the existence of parallel memories in private and public spaces shrink the possibility of a shared understanding which in turn affects a genuine reconciliation. Because of the absence of actual reconciliation, achieving sustained peace in Rwanda is elusive.
Limitations of the Study

The boundaries of this study include the unreliability of generalizing a whole Hutu population using a sample of ten Rwandan Hutus in the United States. There could be a chance that Hutus in Rwanda have a different memory based on their position in the societal class. However, based on the literature review and data from public spaces, the research’s finding is consistent with other scholars’ findings on Rwanda. There is an overwhelming consensus that the memorialization of the Rwandan genocide skews for the advantage of Rwandan Tutsis.
Chapter Three: Public Memory of Rwandan Genocide

The Rwandan media regularly get disgraced for its critical role in causing the genocide of 1994. For example, the Hutu power used radio to broadcast hate speeches encouraging Rwandans to raise up in arms and participate in the duty of killing Tutsis. One radio station, in particular, Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines, also known as RTLM had predicted that “a little something” was going to happen in April in Rwanda. During the genocide, many radio personalities encouraged youths to undertake their “civic duties” by participating in the killings. The international media garnered criticism for presenting the genocide as another case of ethnic conflict in Africa not worthy of airtime. The “lethargic” media engagement about the Rwandan genocide enraged many people internationally. In post-genocide Rwanda, the media has been on the forefront of rectifying their reputation by engaging in commemorations, reporting on genocide survivors, and promoting healing and reconciliation. Nevertheless, based on reports emanating from Hutus and opposition figures critical to the RPF, it is essential to examine how the media remembers the Rwandan genocide. Is there a possibility that public remembrances occur in a way that undermines individual Hutu stories?

In this thesis, media refers to television, film, and cinema. This thesis classifies print media in the form of newspapers and magazines as press. As such, when I discuss media houses such as the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor or The Guardian, I categorize them as the press. Based on research from cinema, newspaper articles and media in Rwanda, I found that one side of the conflict- the Tutsi- side of the story disproportionately gets coverage at the expense of the Hutu stories. The Hutu story often surfaces as perpetrators and not as victims of that tragic event. Whereas this is true for the most part,

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135 Kofi Anan. and Allan Thompson, The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2007) pg. ix
individual accounts and scholarly research demonstrate that a minority of Hutus were also victims or survivors.

My findings stem from the work of Paul Ricoeur, a leading memory theorist and a combination of the work of other theorists already covered in the literature review. Ricoeur’s theory of memory provides a grounding for the possibility of an incomplete memory of the genocide. According to Ricoeur, an authority can control a historical narrative about an individual event. By doing so, that authority can then socially construct memory based on its agenda for the future generations. However, the existence of such socially constructed memory does not eliminate the possibility of having different memories of the same event, and there could be an "adversarial relationship" 136 between personal experience and public memory. Therefore, the commemoration of the Rwandan genocide in the media could perhaps be misrepresenting the private memories of Hutu people. The possibility of sanctioned Hutu memory is conceivable because of the political context of post-genocide Rwanda, the desire of the international media to cleanse itself from the guilt of inactivity during the genocide, and the sheer influence of the post-genocide image of Rwanda internationally.

The media, by its photographic nature, ubiquitously creates a memory. The media is pervasive; it is also documented and captivating. While other means of public memory may be significant, the media is the most influential because it reaches a broad range of people. Edward Casey, a memory scholar and writer of Public Memory in Place and Time, argues that one characteristic of public memory, represented by the media is that it is "understood right away, without hesitation or interpretation, in its basic significance." 137 Historian Gary Edgerton in the book Television as Historian also highlights such an acknowledgment of media’s strength. Edgerton contends that television is modern historian and shaper of public memory.

137 Edward, Casey, "Public Memory in Place and Time." In Framing Public Memory (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004)pg.17
“Television is the principal means by which most people learn about history today... the media’s non-fictional and fictional portrayals have similarly transformed the way viewers think about historical figures.”

Multimedia provides an excellent opportunity for those who may wish to write or re-write history.

Silent Dissent: Rwandan Media and Genocide Memory

Rather than start from international media, it may be prudent to examine the Rwandan media to see if there is objectivity on stories about the Rwandan genocide. I suggest that a good starting point would be examining the “shrinking space of media freedom” within President Kagame’s desire for “historical clarity” of the events of 1994. Reporters without Borders ranks Rwanda 161 out of 180 countries regarding press freedom index. Even though Rwanda recently changed the law to guarantee media freedom by amending the countries media laws, article (234) of the state's law warns journalists of prison sentences of up to one year for words deemed insulting. “Insults” to the president are punishable by five-year prison terms. Rwandan government censors the press, and the restriction works in two ways. Either journalists voluntarily keeps off controversial stories or the states enforces censorship by closing down renegade media houses. In the recent past, journalists questioning the government’s policies on genocide memorials have been harassed and imprisoned with charges ranging from conspiracy to overthrow the government, genocide ideologies, and terrorism. Under this circumstance, it is almost impossible for stories that focus on Hutu heroism, suffering or victimhood during the genocide to gain coverage. With a restricted media space in Rwanda, even independent film companies only rely on officially

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acknowledged accounts of the genocide thus allowing a biased account that limits the possibility of diversifying the accounts of the genocide.

In 2010, Agnes Uwimana and Saidati Mukakibibi, two editors of nationally acclaimed Kinyarwanda newspaper *Umurabyo*, were sentenced to seventeen years and seven years respectively. The charges leveled against them included “publishing falsehood” and “threatening state security” by defaming the president and causing ethnic division.¹⁴² In 2012, Epaphrodite Habarugira, a radio presenter from the city of Gitarama, was detained for more than two months on accusations connected to minimizing the Rwandan genocide. Haburugira apparently mixed up the terms “victims” and “survivors” about Hutu and not Tutsis during a genocide commemoration event.¹⁴³ Today, Rwandan state media is still controlled and highly regulated in content about the genocide and the political affairs of the country. With a tight cap on what happens in Rwandan media, stories coming out of Rwanda regarding the genocide support the state’s account. Stories relating to Rwandan military activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo are also not reportable in Rwanda. The United Nations has accused Rwanda of supporting Tutsi rebel groups such as M23 in the Congo. The same case applies to President Kagame whose activities are similarly off-limits. It is not advisable for any journalist in Rwanda to report a story that portrays the head of state negatively. Such portrayals could be about the President’s activities as a rebel leader when many Hutus were massacred in Eastern Rwanda. Equally, the activities of RPF soldiers after the Rwandan genocide are not subject of media’s discussion. Anton Harber, a professor of journalism at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa, quoted a Rwandan journalist who requested anonymity.

“Our president is not a just a president, our president is like a god, stories against the president are sacred.”\textsuperscript{144}

Ricœur stated that private memory defines an individual’s account; for example, one can say “my memory of a given event,” which implies a personal account. Personal memory is private memory attributed to a single person.\textsuperscript{145} Given the limited access to information in the Rwandan case, it is perhaps realistic to say that the Rwandan memory of the genocide is, for the most part, memory as desired by RPF. There is a chance that individual memories backed up by lived experience of Hutus might be detached from the public memory of those events. This possibility reinforces the government of Rwanda’s insistence on a carefully streamlined narrative of the 1994 genocide—the Hutus in power killed Tutsis—any other reporting that question this assertion, or a view that acknowledges that many other Hutus also died is subject to an accusation of “minimizing the genocide.”

The Rwandan government leveled charges of “minimizing the genocide” to Rwandan media practitioners, but they charged the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) with producing media materials that were “controversial stories portraying genocide denial or revisionism.” In 2014, The BBC produced a documentary titled “Rwanda’s Untold Story” that questioned the official version of the genocide. Following the airing of this documentary, Rwandan government suspended BBC broadcasts in Rwanda in Kinyarwanda, English and Kiswahili. The cancellation of BBC’s broadcasts showed how Rwandan authorities react to criticism. Amidst these acts of repressing the media, the government has banned discussion of ethnicity, accusing people that use the word “Tutsi or Hutu” as propagating ethnic divisionism. The Rwandan government justifies its actions using promoting national unity and forging a future of a united Rwanda. However, it is also one way in which the Rwandan government is using to


silence dissenting stories about the Rwandan genocide. The memory of genocide projected internationally is one that the Rwandan state sees fit. Kagame’s desire for historical clarity goes against Ricœur’s theory that argues that individual formulates memories by forces of collective memory. The absence of an accepted Hutu memory of the genocide in public leaves space for the creation of a manufactured memory.

Post-Genocide Cinematic Memory

Other than the Jewish Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide is perhaps the most recreated genocide in the media. The BBC was the first to produce a film about the genocide titled Journey into Darkness (1994). Journey into Darkness was followed by other productions, the latest being Rwanda’s Untold Truth (2014). Hollywood has also produced movies about the Rwandan genocide including Sometimes in April (2005), Shooting Dogs (2005), A Sunday in Kigali, (2006), Shake Hands with the Devil (2007) and the academy award winning Hotel Rwanda (2004). Post-genocide films fall into many categories. There are films made for the victims, films made by people that witnessed the genocide, and the documentaries that examine the justice and reconciliation process. Further, some films attempt to explain the circumstances of the 1994 genocide. While raising awareness, cinema has also omitted some stories that would have nuanced the public’s understanding of the events of 1994. In my study, I found that: Firstly, most of the films about the Rwandan genocide tell a Tutsi inspired a story. Secondly, except for rare critical films, most of the movies report about the genocide without the necessary context. Thirdly, the Rwandan government has banned, castigated or charged producers of films that question the official narratives of the genocide with “genocide denial and revisionism of history.” My view is that media’s coverage of the Rwandan genocide demonstrates what Ricœur calls a “source of oppression and distortion of the past.”

As Joane Hansen as asserted in Media and Memory, media in visual, print, and audio engaged in

dialogue with both history and memory. Memory becomes an aggregate of personal and public recollection. The past is understood through media discourses, technologies, and practices. Nevertheless, our understanding of the past is closely linked to our life histories. Consequently, mediated accounts of events such as genocides intermingle in our minds with what is available in multimedia, museums, heritage site and books.147 Therefore, for those uninformed about certain events, the media is their primary source of information. Individuals with a lived experience have a continuous debate of memory between the actual lived experience and mediated memory.

Even as film inscribes and realizes a certain visibility of the past, at the same time, they silence unrepresented voices and consequently institutionalizing some aspects of the remembered event. Cinematic memory scholar Alexandre Dauge-Roth argued that cinematic memories are symbolic acts of remembering that should be seen as “uneasy and disturbing quest for justice so that the dead are not erased from the memory of the living.”148 Dauge-Roth goes on to argue that when a cinematic representation positions itself as the “true remembrance,” it “commits symbolic violence” since it determines what is worthy of memory.149 Thomas Leitch, a film scholar, also states that although cinema is a useful recording of history, “they can be no more accurate records of historical events than they purport to represent.”150 In the end, the consequence of film memory is that it shortchanges history at the expense of the pursuit of political correctness, economic reason, time, and scope.

Rwandan genocide films are not immune from the shortcomings mentioned above. The films on the Rwandan genocide are often simplistic and devoid of nuances. Although raising awareness, cinema has also omitted some stories that would have nuanced the public’s understanding of the events of 1994. The

147 Joanne Hansen, Media and Memory (Edinburgh, United Kingd: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) pg.6
148 Alexandre Roth, Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2010) pg.5
149 Alexandre Roth, Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2010) pg. 6
150 Thomas Leitch, Film Adaptation and Its Discontents: From "Gone with the Wind" to "The Passion of the Christ" (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2009) pg. 282
RPF’s invasion of Rwanda in the early 1990s was a critical aspect of the genocide in 1994. First, it militarized the Rwandan society in readiness for an external attack. While the rebels were of Rwandan origin, the fact that they were mainly Tutsis allowed the extremists in the NRMD to exploit Rwandan history to their advantage. Tutsis are historical aristocrats who had collaborated with and benefited from the Germans and later Belgians in the colonial period.\textsuperscript{151}

Second, the RPF rebel activities defined the enemy. Whereas Hutus were killed as individuals, Tutsis were killed as a group.\textsuperscript{152} The Rwandan genocide was a genocide by “those who saw themselves as sons and daughters of the soil, and their mission as one of clearing the ground of a threatening alien presence.”\textsuperscript{153} Rather than reduce violence into Rwanda into distinct categories, such as civil war, genocide, and RPF surge to eliminate reorganizing Hutu rebels, an understanding of Rwanda’s political dynamics requires coming to terms with the culture of violence from the early 1990s to the turn of the century. Rwanda was in a “continuum of violence” and the genocide was the utmost peak of that Rwandan genocide cycle.\textsuperscript{154} After the genocide, RPF continued with an excess of violence by pursuing returning Hutu refugees in northwestern Rwanda.\textsuperscript{155} From that vantage point, this study asks the question, what is worth memory within the “continuum of violence” about Rwanda?

In the study, I found that scholars place a greater level of emphasis on the events that occurred between the months of April and July of 1994. For many people, this would make sense because it is when the genocide took place. Nevertheless, a critical examination of Rwandan history and a phenomenological account of many Hutus requires that a holistic consideration of the events before and after that block of

\textsuperscript{151} Elizabeth Obadina, “Hutus and Tutsis: Genocide in Rwanda.” In Ethnic Groups in Africa (Broomall, PA: Mason Crest, 2014) chapter 5
\textsuperscript{152} Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2014) pg.5
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid pg 6
\textsuperscript{154} Susan Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in Post genocide Rwanda (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013) pg.79
\textsuperscript{155} Scott Straus, Remaking Rwanda State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011) pg. 67
time. In short, the film accounts of the genocide minimize Hutu stories by reducing the violence to one block of time. Instead of focusing on Rwandan conflict as a “continuum of violence,” the cinematography misses the subsequent events in colonial Rwanda, the RPF’s activities in the Uganda-Rwanda border and the revenge killings conducted in Zaire by Rwandan Tutsi-led soldiers (now Democratic Republic of Congo). While RPF will diminish such stories as “minimizing the genocide” they graduate our understanding of the conflict in Rwanda and bring the much-needed closure for many victims.

In *Film and Genocide*, genocide scholars Kristin Wilson and Tomas Taraborrelli write, “theoretically, cinema has an advantage over literature in the quest for realism.” The photograph is a better means of objective representation and a stronger immediate and severe impact on the viewer. If the Rwandan genocide happened in a “continuum of violence,” then it is possible that the deaths of many Hutus will gain acknowledgment hence diminishing the conventional Tutsi narrative. Within a context of a civil war, the distinction of who is wrong and who is right is often murky. Therefore, it is possible that a cinematic expression of this context would give Hutus a fair historical depiction. The memory of the Rwandan Hutu people is accusatorial with public memory of the same events.

A related feature of the cinematic representation of the Rwandan genocide is the omission of historical context. Few of the cinemas made on the Rwandan genocide delve into the historical and political underpinnings of the pre-genocide and the post-genocide Rwanda. Terry George’s *Hotel Rwanda* depicts one of the most famous accounts. In the movie, there is a scene between a Western journalist and a Rwandan bartender. This scene creates the understanding that there were barely any social distinctions between Hutus and Tutsis. Rwandan history reveals that Rwandan society has always been divided between classes, not decidedly racial and ethnic, but socio-economic. Minimizing the history of Rwanda in *Hotel Rwanda* reduces the context and lays the ground for sanctioned memory. As viewers watch, they

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ask: why would people so similar in ways and language kill their counterparts? The answers to these questions lead to the argument of the “Rwandan oddity” or by extension “African oddity.” In Rwanda, the underlying assumption would be an “odd and criminal adult population.” However, if stories of Hutus would be told, Hutus would likely escape the accusation of being “odd” and” criminal.”

Hotel Rwanda misses the context by minimizing the number of Hutu deaths during the genocide. In the movie, there are Tutsis sympathizers killed, but there is no single picture showing the deaths of Rwandan Hutus’ during the genocide. While such mishaps appear as little editing flaws, they create a visual overview of the Rwandan genocide as only Tutsi genocide. The public understanding of the genocide comes from mainstream media’s depiction of the Rwandan genocide as an act committed against the Tutsis by the Hutus. Public memory, synonymous with collective memory, constructs images of the world by continually forming and reforming past versions establishing boundaries between one group of people and others. Consequently, public memory relies on public articulation, depiction, and thought. Public memory is, therefore, subject to mediation.158

Subsequently, while Hotel Rwanda creates an open space for a moral account of a Hutu voice, it limits its scope by focusing right within the Rwandan genocide. Hotel Rwanda does not show the RPF’s invasion of Rwanda neither does it depict the underlying class issues that might have led to the genocide. Within the context of the massacre of minority Tutsi, the protagonist whose wife is Tutsi is challenged, first to protect his family, and second, his friends and co-workers. The movie depicts Paul Rusasebegina’s evolving moral conviction and his struggle to keep off his Hutu men from killing Tutsis that were close to him. In contrast, the viewer misses Rusasebegina’s feelings about Hutu deaths. Because of this limited context, the story told about Rwandan genocide is devoid of critical circumstances that might have nuanced the public understanding and memory. Even though Hotel Rwanda is an enactment of the

Rwandan genocide that presents the often-untold stories of Hutu heroes and a critical documentation of Rwandan genocide in public memories, it does so by limiting essential context of the pre-and post-genocide that could have shifted public memory of the Rwandan genocide. In so doing, *Hotel Rwanda* joins the club of films made about Rwanda that perpetuated a Tutsi inspired story of the events. The hero, Paul Rusesabagina (Hutu) is in exile in Belgium and is under accusations by the Rwandan regime as an enemy of the state.159

*Sometimes in April* (2005) qualifies as one of the most provocative movies made about the Rwandan genocide. *Sometimes in April* is provoking because indicts the western nations of neglecting Rwanda. Secondly, the movie places to Hutu brothers on two opposite sides of the conflict. *Sometimes in April* focuses on the stories of two Hutu brothers caught on opposite sides during the Rwandan genocide. Augustin is a Hutu soldier (Idris Elba) married to a Tutsi wife Jeanne (Carole Karemera). Augustin’s brother Honore (Oris Erhuero) is a radio journalist working with the hate radio station infamous for inciting Hutus to kill the “cockroaches” Tutsi. Because of his position as a government soldier, Augustin is late to realize that genocide is underway. In the meantime, the international community is aware that genocide is going on in Rwanda but fails to act because of political considerations. The U.S., for example, decided to ignore the genocide because of previous failures after the intervention in Somalia. Unlike *Hotel Rwanda*, *Sometimes in April* permeates itself with a review of Rwanda’s colonial history with Germany and Belgium. Filmed in Rwanda, the movie is credible because it harnesses on the perception of originality. In the film, Augustin’s brother Honore is going through trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Tanzania for his role in inciting the masses to kill Tutsis using the public radio. Honore’s participation in the genocide and his wife’s death in the hand of extremists traumatizes Augustin.

Sometimes in April does well to depict Western hypocrisy and to present a realistic picture of the killings. The movie shows more detailed and grotesque scenes of violence than Hotel Rwanda. Still, Sometimes in April does not escape the accusation of being simplistic. Haitian-born director Raoul Peck does an excellent job making Westerners guilty of inaction by focusing on Washington’s indolent response but is shallow on the politics of Rwanda. By zooming on the contrasting sides of two Hutu brothers, the movie continues the trajectories of one Hutu “good man” in the sea of evil Hutus. The film does not show the Hutu deaths even as it attempts to share Hutu suffering through Augustin’s grieving for his wife. Similarly, like Hotel Rwanda, Peck’s film is a bit naïve on its depiction of the decimation of post-genocide justice since it does not examine the type of justice offered. Second, the movie fails to consider the political situation in Rwanda before the genocide. Clearly, Sometimes in April is a great film, but it also lacks a comprehensive analysis of the murky events in Rwanda. Sometimes in April’s contribution in public memory is as narrow and simplistic as Hotel Rwanda’s.

Shooting Dogs (2005) is a British film that attempts to simplify the complexity of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide so that Western audiences understand it. Made in two different styles, documentary, and fiction, the film assumes an unusual tone on the director’s view on the genocide. Michael Caton-Jones who reduced the 100 days bloodletting into six days, April 6-11, 1994 at Ecole Technique Officielle directs the movie. Tutsis escape from Hutu extremists because they assume that the presence of Belgian United Nations Peace Keepers would offer security at the college. However, this glimpse of hope is thwarted by the helplessness of the Belgian soldiers because of orders from foreign-based superiors. These events are reported through eyes of two westerners; one Catholic priest called Christopher (John Hurt), and BBC journalist called Joe (Hugh Dancy).

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Shooting Dogs was subject to substantial criticism for its manipulation of real events, telling stories from the perspectives of Westerners instead of locals and for their clear depiction of RPF as the good people in the movie. Linda Melvern, author of the book A People Betrayed: The Role of The West in Rwanda’s Genocide is one of the film’s most vocal critics. She wrote that the “film was shocking in regards to historical clarity” particularly for stating that BBC reporters challenged the Belgian soldiers on their way out. She also disputed the fact that the BBC was the first media house to declare the killings a genocide. Linda Melvern sees the film as an attempt by the BBC to elevate its role during the genocide and distance itself from other Western media houses.

Like Melvern, I view the film’s fault as depicting Rwandans as either victims or perpetrators. Historical accounts have shown that such classifications are open to review. In the context of the Rwandan genocide, it was difficult to distinguish victims or perpetrators. Also, the highly racialized view of the world that assumes that the Rwandan genocide was an “African oddity” influences the film. The film suggests that acts as heinous as the genocide can only happen in Africa. Moreover, because of that, it was the West’s responsibility to stop the killings.

It is credible to question the rationale for remembering mass atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide. Documentation of horrors that people commit against one another is ill advised if that particular documentation or memorialization does not address either the ethical dimension of remembering and does not affect the society in a way that generates awareness and respect in present actions. Significantly, as observed in the films discussed, films seek to intervene in memory in a manner that depicts Hutus in a negative light while aware that the addition of some mundane details may very well change that perception.

162 Ibid
The Guilty Press and Renewed Agency

The Rwandan genocide has become ubiquitous in the international press in the last decade. Mostly published in American and European print media, the genocide publications document not only the memory of the genocide but also the success story of Rwanda’s national building experiment. While the press’s role in the genocide is documented, the new obsession with Rwanda is perhaps an attempt of the press to exonerate itself from blame for not doing enough during the genocide. Still, there is a possibility that the press, especially the press representation of Rwanda’s post-genocide reality, lacks accuracy. For that matter, it is significant to analyze the news coverage of Rwanda’s memorialization of the genocide.

In the attempt at examining the press’ coverage of Rwanda, I will consider if there is a visible distinction between how the international media and the Rwandan media cover memory of the genocide. Is there a possibility that some voices in Rwanda are silent? I will also examine how time and recent political developments in Rwanda have changed reporting of the genocide. The reason for analyzing international press separately from Rwandan press is the concerns over freedom of speech. In Rwanda, as has been discussed before, there are challenges to freedom of expression. Knowing this, one would reason that perhaps the international media might have a more independent reporting of the Rwandan genocide. Time is a critical aspect of memory since it allows various information to come forth that possibly change the analysis of events.

First, it important to understand why the press continues to cover the genocide. According to Alexandre Dauge-Roth, the Rwandan genocide has an immense focus on the media because the literature attempts “to forge social recognition for the personal and collective trauma that continues to haunt the victims of

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the genocide so that their loss and suffering can no longer be ignored.”¹⁶⁴ As Joane Hansen has asserted in *Media and Memory*, media in visual, print and audio engages in dialogue with both history and memory. Memory becomes an aggregate of personal and public recollection. The past relives through media discourses, technologies, and practices. Nevertheless, our understanding of the past links to our life histories. Consequently, mediated accounts of events such as genocides intermingle in our minds with what is available in multimedia, museums, heritage sites and books.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, for those uninformed about certain events, the media is their primary source of information. Individuals with a lived experience have a continuous debate of memory between the actual lived experience and mediated memory. Personal pain is distinguishable from public memory created by literary work in the press, media and other available documents in public spaces.¹⁶⁶

Press reports on the Rwandan genocide have published individual stories within the context of reconciliation and post-genocidal national building. The methodology of letting individuals tell their stories is one way of handling the complexities that surround tragic events such as the Rwandan genocide. While such a method is understandable and squarely in line with journalistic professionalism, a particular pattern develops that inherently renders one side of the story voiceless.¹⁶⁷ The Hutus in the diaspora and Rwanda have not gotten a chance to tell their story. The absence of Hutu stories allows as a one-sided memory of the genocide as a contest between the all criminal Hutu versus the innocent Tutsis. For the most part, this is how the press has reported about the Rwandan genocide. Recently, there has been a slight shift thanks to the international restlessness with Kagame’s desire to extend his presidential term limit. As a result, there is an appeal for considering more factors in regards to reporting about the Rwandan genocide. In my attempt to examine if the memory of the genocide reported in the press is less

¹⁶⁴ Alexandre Roth, *Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History* (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2010) pg.26
¹⁶⁵ Joanne Hansen, *Media and Memory* (Edinburgh, United Kingd: Edinburgh University Press, 2011) pg.6
¹⁶⁶ Alexandre Roth, *Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History* (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2010) pg.26
comprehensive than individual accounts, I will consider memorialization of the Rwandan genocide in *The New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and England’s *Guardian*. I chose these newspapers because of their extensive international affairs coverage and their reputable credentials.

In this analysis, I utilize Ricoeur’s memory theory, particularly his emphasis on phenomenology. Therefore, one has to ask the question, what are these memories? Whose memories are these? Borrowing from Alfred Schultz’s “Fifth Meditation,” Ricoeur argues that the experience of others be as valuable as the experience of self. Hence, the phenomenology of the social world permeates into the order of life, which in its essence is the shared experience of living together. In this context, acting and sufferings translate into memory. Hence, memory becomes a threefold affair, “memory to oneself, to one’s close relations, and to others.”\(^{168}\) Even though memory connects to specific events such as the Rwandan genocide, newspapers representing memory literature heighten aspects or sides of memory while silencing others.

I argue that the publications mentioned above offer a post-memory experience that anchors in the reliance of highly structured and accepted standards of what happened in Rwanda. With limited exceptions and with the difficulty of accessing information in Rwanda, most newspapers have resorted to “playing safe.” For many years, these publications have been silent on the operations of RPF in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the atrocities committed on Rwandan refugees in the Congo, and the nature of the invasion of RPF into Rwanda as well as the deaths of many Hutus during the genocide.

*The Guardian*, for example, on January 17, 2012, published a story titled “Paul Kagame cleared of a part in 1994 downing of the Rwandan president’s plane.”\(^{169}\) The article reported that ballistic experts conducted research to locate where the plane went down. Their findings exonerated Paul Kagame. These

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\(^{168}\) Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellaur. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) pg. 132  
findings had huge implications on what was, until then, and still is one of the most controversial issues regarding the Rwandan genocide. The \textit{Guardian} also published a story written on January 10, 2012, titled “Rwanda: At Last We Know the Truth.”\textsuperscript{170}The article argues that the ballistic expert’s findings on who shot the plane in Rwanda absolve the RPF’s regime from blame. The article goes further to claim that the findings are embarrassing to France since they had taken the position that RPF had shot down the plane to cause instability and subsequently capture power in Kigali.

The \textit{Guardian’s} report on this does not include the findings of other reports. Right after the downing of the plane and subsequent genocide, it was highly suspected that Hutu extremist who wanted to start a genocide downed the plane.\textsuperscript{171} However, there have been reports that the aircraft’s shooting was on orders of Paul Kagame. The RPF have openly supported the accusation that Hutu extremists downed the plane in April of 1994.\textsuperscript{172} The United Nations and Belgium have refused to support either position.\textsuperscript{173} In 2004, a French anti-terrorist magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguier asserted that Paul Kagame, through proxies, carried out the presidential assassinations. Paul Rusesabagina, the hero in \textit{Hotel Rwanda}, who alleged that Paul Kagame and RPF were behind the downing of the presidential plane, expressed similar sentiments.\textsuperscript{174} In November 2006, Rusesabagina wrote that it was against logic that the United Nations Security Council had never investigated or established findings in the downing of the plane, an incident that sparked the Rwandan genocide in 1994.\textsuperscript{175} In 2014, the BBC aired a documentary titled \textit{Rwanda’s Untold Truth} that

had leading ex-members of RPF, who confessed on camera that RPF had downed the plane.\textsuperscript{176} The Guardians only reported about one finding further heightening the controversy surrounding the issue.

In this case, The Guardian’s report further illustrates the lack of certainty on what caused the genocide. Regardless, the article sympathizes with the RPF by reporting in a manner that alludes to the conventional understanding of the genocide. This traditional understanding holds the view that Hutu extremists committed the genocide. The downing of the plane, although a critical juncture of the genocidal killings remains a contentious issue open for interpretation. By reporting this story in this manner, the Guardian’s memorialization of the Rwandan genocide diminishes a chance for an opposite theory of the cause of the genocide. The newspaper report thus compliments given accounts while sanctioning others. For example, French position in this matter qualifies as a “source of embarrassment” according to the Guardians.\textsuperscript{177}

Reconciliation and unity are misleading and devoid of accuracy in Rwanda. Threats of violence have tended to increase during the commemorations from the government, extremists and activists in the recent past especially during the reign of RPF (1995-2016).\textsuperscript{178}

The New York Times reporting of the Rwandan genocide reports the difficulty of reconciliation many years after the genocide. Its report does little reporting on the grievances of the Hutu majority. Between 1994 and 2010, The New York Times reported on Rwanda favorably to the RPF and the Kagame’s regime. These reports were often reconciliatory and based on guilt of inaction and indifference during the massacres of 1994. Just like the United States government, The New York Times had a moral obligation to be sympathetic to the Rwandan state. Perhaps this sympathy arises from the Western press’ inaction during the genocide. Possibly, the fascination with Rwanda’s progress was because of the obvious strides that the country has made after the genocide. Either way, the New York Times reporting on Rwanda was

\textsuperscript{177} Communicating Awe, (164).
\textsuperscript{178} Alexandre Roth, Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2010) pg. 5
favorable to the RPF. Headlines such as “Rwanda Rebel’s Victory Attributed to Discipline” (July 19, 1994), “Rwanda Rebels: Army exiles fights for a home” (June 9, 1994), “French Guns, Rwandan Blood” (April 4, 1994), among other titles. Such claims indicate not the only fascination with the Tutsi rebels as heroes but also showed that a trend of a victors’ story was emerging.

Since 2010, as Kagame’s insistence on staying on power endangers his reputation as a reformer. The New York Times has reported on Rwanda in a balanced manner. Regardless, stories of Hutus come out as political dissents instead of narratives of the genocide. Titles such as “Rwanda Leader Heads to new term under shadow of repression” (August 10', 2010), “The Darling Dictator of the Day” (May 27, 2012), “The Global Elite’s Favorite Strongman” (September 8, 2013), and “Why are Rwandans Disappearing” (June 18, 2014) frequent the paper’s reports on Rwanda. Staff writer for the New York Times, Stephen Smith, in the article titled “War Crimes and Rwandan Realities”, summarized this love/hate relationship between the New York Times and Rwandan government writing:

> The post-genocide regime in Rwanda has many friends around the world for understandable — and in most cases, honorable — reasons. Horrified as we were by the bloodbath in 1994, and ashamed by our inability to prevent or stop it, who would want to believe that the good face Mr. Kagame has put on Rwanda — creating an image as a prospering and healing nation — is, in fact, a lie? Today, opposition voices in Rwanda have been completely silenced. 179

Like many other newspapers, The New York Times reports more on Rwandan genocide focusing on reconciliation and forging ahead instead of the intricacies of the memory of the genocide. However, the fascination with RPF as the “virtuous rebels” is changing, as the New York Times gets fatigued with Kagame’s prolonged stay in power.

The Christian Science Monitor, on the other hand, chronicles the Rwandan genocide in a more comprehensive light. On May 7, 2015, The Christian Science Monitor reported a story about a marriage

between the son of a Hutu genocide perpetrator and Tutsi survivor. The story documents the reality of the Rwandan quagmire and defeats ethnic hatred by focusing on love. On April 14, 2014, The Christian Science Monitor reported a story of Rwanda genocide orphans regaining their history by use of photographs taken twenty years ago. Many of the children had never seen the pictures taken by an unnamed non-governmental organization. On August 7, 2008, the newspaper reported the story of 9-year-old Rwandan refugee that had found a home in suburban Atlanta. Considering that media plays a critical role in memory, these pictures dialogue with public and personal memories often negotiating the need to relate to the wider history. Within the broader histories, visual documentation embeds the individual human experiences.

Through the above stories, the magazine highlights the resilience of the Rwandan people, especially how they have managed to forge a life after the genocide. The Christian Science Monitor has also published critical reports on Rwanda. On June 8, 2009, The Christian Science Monitor wrote the story of Neema. Neema was a Rwandan refugee who was at the time living in Dares Salaam. Neema’s father was Hutu, who was killed by Tutsi soldiers who burst in their house in Rwanda and shot his dad to death while his entire family watched. In this report, the writer asks, “What is Neema Really? A victim and a survivor? A mother? A child? A stateless migrant, buffeted by the political, social violence that has swept central Africa since she was a child.” Neema’s mother relocated to the United States as a refugee, but Neema did not get a visa because she was already eighteen when her mother came to the United States. Despite her experiences, Neema has to prove to the United States government that living in Tanzania endangers

her life since she lives with people (Tutsis) that killed her family members. Neema’s story is one of many Rwandans caught in the mix of the blanket distinction of either victim or perpetrator. They are neither Hutus nor Tutsis; they lost one or two parents during the genocide. Sadly, stories such as Neema’s are missing in the usual memory of the Rwandan genocide.  

_The Christian Science Monitor_ reports the concerns of the always forgotten minority of the Twa community. April 14, 2015, the issue of the publication documented Rwandan genocide memory in the context of the Twa people. The Twa, a small minority population of Rwanda composing less than one percent of the total population, were neither victims nor perpetrators during the genocide. According to _The Christian Science Monitor_, some Twa people found themselves submerged in the conflict forcing them to be victims and perpetrators of individual cases. The Twa’s grievances have a limited voice in the reconciliation process. The Twa’s stories are rarely mentioned during commemorations. The community is also losing their identity because of the encroachment of neoliberal development projects in the forests.

In the article published on April 7th, 2014, the _Christian Science Monitor_ documented the success story of the Rwandan regimes alongside its failures twenty years after the genocide. Perhaps one of the most balanced assessments of the memory of genocide in Rwanda, the article argues that the RPF markets its development success, achievements in reconciliation and its role in ending the genocide. But, RPF story is “drastically wide from the truth” since it overlooks minor details that are critical to the understanding of Rwandan post-genocide society. First, the story does not mention that RPF regime killed thousands of people, both innocent and guilty, to end the genocide. After the genocide, RPF continued the killings in

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the Congo under the pretext of capturing runaway genociders.\textsuperscript{186} The publication remarked, “Everyone is encouraged to absorb a nationally sanctioned memory that critics say is turning into an ideology.”\textsuperscript{187}

The findings in the press, using the cases of \textit{The Guardian} from the United Kingdom, \textit{The New York Times}, and \textit{The Christian Science Monitor} show that reporting on Rwanda goes in line with the rest of the media that focus on Tutsi inspired stories. With respect to time, the press’ memory of the Rwandan genocide has changed to reflect variances that accrue from individual accounts. Of the three newspapers, \textit{The Christian Science Monitor} is the most critical of the RPF regime. \textit{The New York Times} acclaimed as the United States’ leading paper, was vocal about its support of Kagame’s regime but has changed its tune and has become critical of the RPF. The \textit{New York Time’s} change of tune has nothing to do with their perception of the Rwandan genocide but by Kagame’s increasingly authoritarian government. In general, the consensus in the two U.S. based newspapers is that there is more to the genocide than what the world knows.

\textit{Conclusion}

In this chapter, I have leaned on Ricœur’s ideas to argue that cinematic memorialization of the Rwanda genocide is skewed and some stories, particularly those that challenge the taste of the authorities are silenced. I make the argument that Hutu memories are undermined. The consequence of such a one-sided memory is that it misses the opportunity of truth telling that is critical for reconciliation. In \textit{Film and Genocide}, Kristin Wilson and Tomas Taraborrelli writes, “theoretically; cinema has an advantage over literature in the quest for realism.”\textsuperscript{188} The photograph is a better means of objective representation and a stronger immediate and serious impact on the viewer.\textsuperscript{189} In the context of Rwanda, film tries so hard to

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid
\textsuperscript{188} Kristi Wilson and Tomas Taraborrelli, \textit{Film and Genocide} (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012) pg ix.
\textsuperscript{189} Kristi Wilson and Tomas Taraborrelli, \textit{Film and Genocide} (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012) pg ix.
provide hope thus distorting reality. Regardless of the context, the plight of Hutus who died during the genocide is glaringly underreported. During my research, I counted thirty films that focus on the Rwandan genocide. Of all the thirty films, none of them focuses on the plight of Hutus during the genocide. Rightly, Rwandan scholar Gerrard Prunier has described the current public memory of the genocide as “Tutsification of the genocide.”\(^{190}\) The underpinnings of the “Tutsification of the genocide” is degrading for many Hutus who lost their lives while saving the lives of fellow Tutsi Rwandans. In cinema, they are mentioned in passing as “moderate Hutus,” but only in passing.

Rarely does an in-depth analysis of a Hutu survivor captures the attention of the media. If a Hutu is mentioned, as in the case of Sometimes in April (Augustine played by Idris Elba), the story is often of their act of defiance against the majority Hutu. Stories of Hutu victims are rare and unsought. Even though the absence of Hutu survivors and victims’ makes sense because the genocide was against Tutsis, it sanctions the stories of many Hutu families who also lost their families. The missing narrative of these Hutu survivors would immensely enrich our understanding of the Rwandan genocide.

The memorialization of the Rwandan is sanctioned what is remembered is orchestrated by the government that utilizes the RPF’s moral authority as the stoppers of the genocide to gain international mileage.\(^{191}\) Similarly, the business community, especially Hollywood film industry would more often profit from a simplistic dramatization of the genocide than bombard the public with complicated nuances. The Rwandan government is Tutsi-dominated, so by default, the memory of the genocide is a Tutsi inspired version of events. Regardless of the attempts to sanction contrasting memories, there is a failure to produce a singularly accepted account about the genocide.\(^{192}\) Individual accounts, primarily Hutu survivors, grapple with the sufferings of the past. Rwandan media also thwarts this discord in memory.

The Rwandan state using the apparatus at its disposal (media) and discourages the existence of divergent


memories regarding the violence. While the public unequivocally agrees that the genocide did occur, many Rwandans, based on the public sources utilized above, believe that many people across the divide lost their loved ones and deserved commemorations. If the memory of the genocide is accepted, why is the Rwandan state restrictive on events worth of memory during the Rwandan conflict?

In a similar fashion, extremist Hutus have also used the “commemoration season” to express ideologies that dehumanize Tutsi survivors. *The New York Times* issue 11 of April 2007 reported a man who dressed his dog in purple mufflers. The man was reported as telling his friends that he was mourning for all the dogs that died during the genocide. In another issue, *The New York Times* of 19 April 2006, reported that a caller to a local Rwandan radio station dedicated to remembering the genocide called and warned, “We shall kill you again.” These responses, while clearly out of line, could be minimized if the Rwandan authority can allow all voices to be included in the formation of the new post-genocide Rwanda.
Chapter Four: Individual Accounts of Hutus in the USA.

When the Rwandan civil war and genocide ended on July 18th, 1994, the whole country had been devastated. It is rare to find places in the world that have undergone what Rwanda went through. Rwanda had a population of seven million before the genocide, and the population shrank to slightly less than 5 million by 1995. After the war and the genocide, an estimated fifteen percent of the population had died, two million Rwandans had been internally displaced, and over two million were refugees in neighboring countries. Many Rwandan women had been raped during the genocide and a substantial number of people infected with HIV/AIDS. Almost everyone in the country was traumatized; ninety percent of children who survived the genocide were either victims or witnesses of extreme violence. Everyone was a victim except the extremist Hutus who willingly and self-consciously carried the genocide. Rwandans had no other place to stay. Rwandans had to live side by side in the Rwandan hills. In Rwanda, there is no Tutsiland or Hutuland; Rwandans had to interact with the perpetrators and protectors alike in their residences in the hills and valleys that overlap their landscape.

Understandably, both and after the genocide, Rwanda lost a substantial amount of its population to neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Kenya among others. Courtesy of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), some of the Rwandan victims and survivors eventually settled in various European countries and the United States. Others have immigrated to the United States as asylum seekers, permanent residents, and students. This chapter explores how the Rwandan Hutus based in the United States remember the genocide in private and how this differs with how that tragic event is recognized in public. Based on findings, I propose that

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193 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed (New York: Viking Pres, 2005) pg.313
194 Robert Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (Lincoln, NE: IUniverse, 2005) pg. 93
195 Kofi Aman and Allan Thompson, The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2007) pg.29
198 Douglas Besharov and Mark Hugo López, Adjusting to a World in Motion: Trends in Global Migration and Migration Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) pg. 373
the memories of Hutus in the United States possibly conflict with public memory as depicted in both visual and print media. However, within the diaspora Hutu communities, the memory of those events change depending on an individual’s relationship with the Rwandan state led by Paul Kagame and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Consequently, the memory of the genocide is politicized.

Using stories of Hutus both from personal interviews and from publicly available individualized accounts based in the United States. I start by asking the question, is it possible that Hutus, widely viewed as perpetrators, are also victims of the genocide? The desire for using the individual stories of the Hutus is that there is a notable lack of closure regarding the Rwandan genocide.199 I contend, like Susan Thomson, who is a writer and researcher on Rwanda, that Rwandan people are the “knowers” and “recorders” of their life stories.200 Therefore, stories of Hutus in the United States nuances our view of the Rwandan genocide and complicates our understanding of what is the conventional and accepted narrative of the genocide that extremists Hutus killed Tutsis. This thesis’ contribution, in part, is that it brings previously published accounts of Hutus together under “one roof” for analysis even as I document accounts of Hutus that I interviewed.

As I have already stated in the literature review and other previous chapters, I rely on Paul Ricœur’s discussion on memory. In his discussion in the chapter, “Critical Philosophy of History” Ricœur stated, “the mode truth belonging to historical knowledge consists of the play between indeterminacy and its suppression.”201 While Ricœur referred to history, in principle, his analysis applies to memory. Infringed memory poses several challenges. First, it inhibits closure since it does not allow for a general understanding of the conflict to occur. For example, in outrageous cases as genocides, media references

serve as the “first draft of history.”

How the story is told in the media (print media, photography, cinema, television, radio, newspapers and digital media) permanently imprints on the minds of the people for a long time. Mediated account becomes the “primary source of information on the event”. Perhaps one way of determining their accuracy is by comparing mediated accounts with individual stories.

The initial research design was to interview twenty Hutus living in the United States. Although I knew this would be a challenging project, I based my hope on the belief that every individual would desire for his or her story to be told. As an African, I felt that we could have some shared experiences that I could utilize to build relationships with them. During the research, it was hard to find respondents that were willing to talk to me. I wanted to get Rwandans in the D.C area through Ms. Antoinette Kanyabutembo, who is a high-ranking Rwandan officer at the embassy in Washington D.C. When I arrived in D.C, Kanyabutembo had flown to Rwanda for a family issue. I had no immediate connection to other Rwandans in D.C. Consequently, I had to rely on the snowballing sampling research method.

Snowballing sampling is a chain referral way of getting respondents. After interviewing one person, the researcher asks for assistance from the subgroup to identify other people. After several visits at the embassy and numerous calls to my Rwandan friend, I was able to make contact with a Rwandan in D.C. Despite being reluctant to partake in the research, he was willing to introduce me to another Rwandan, who also introduced me to another Rwandan and so forth.

The other problem I ran into during the research was the unwillingness of Rwandans to state their ethnicity openly. I understood their reason based on previous research that ethnic identity was often a source of the stigma associated with the genocide if one was Hutu. To avoid the possibility of being linked to the genocide, it is common for Rwandans to refuse revealing ethnic identity, more so if one is

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204 Philp Clark, *The Gacaca Courts, Post-genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pg. 5
not Tutsi. While the “stigma” argument was a reason for many Rwandans, others were uncomfortable because of the new policy in Rwanda that nullified ethnic identities. As of 2003, the Rwandan state only recognizes “Banyarwanda” as an identity. Instead of stating reasons for not revealing their ethnicity, many would just say, “it is against our law to state my ethnicity.”

Lastly, as observed by Chandra Sriram, *Surviving Field Research: Working in Violent and Difficult Situations*, “individuals who have lived through violence can exhibit strong reactions to seemingly compassionate acts in unexpected ways.” I was not prepared for rejections of my attempt at interviewing them as I felt that my research was going to be helpful for Hutus, whose stories’ deserved to be acknowledged. I realized that their fears were not only fathomable but also genuine. Usually, intense and emotional interviews on issues as sensitive as the genocide are a grueling task. While they are challenging for the researcher, there could be health reasons and other personal considerations for the respondent. Thus, while it is necessary to get information, it is also important to be concerned about the respondent’s well-being.

I learned that the Rwandan government interference and surveillance were usually intense on political research such as the post-genocide and reconciliation work. One might think that such surveillance is only for researchers conducting research in Rwanda, but I learned that for many Rwandans that territorial boundaries do not limit the reach of their government. This revelation re-educated me on a previously unnoticed nature of the Rwandan state. Rwandans believe that the Rwandan government uses spy networks that are spread across the globe. The task assigned to these “spies” is to harness information

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207 Ibid. 121
on political activism and to track runaway perpetrators of the genocide.\textsuperscript{210} These informants operate by intimidating Rwandans in the diaspora by threatening their families back in Rwanda if they engage on a spectrum of things perceived as “critical or damaging to the state.”\textsuperscript{211} Assassinations of political opponents are widely practiced in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{212} For many Rwandans, this is a good reason to keep away from political activism. The Rwanda government’s effort to silence dissent further illustrates Riceur’s argument that while memory is of the past, it has potential of influencing the future, even challenging authority.\textsuperscript{213}

Regardless, the inability to get enough respondents did not mean the end of the research; it opened other avenues. Through snowballing, a type of sampling explained above; I was able to get ten respondents that shared their accounts. To supplement the ten interviews, I have used publicly available individualized accounts to support the limited number of interviews. Crucially, while the small number of interviews naturally reduces the ability to offer sweeping claims, along with the individualized public Hutu accounts, nevertheless provide a solid basis for hypothesizing an answer to my central question, which is: How is the Rwandan genocide remembered in public places? What are the chances that Hutus widely but simplistically viewed as perpetrators remember the genocide in a publicly sanctioned ways?

The primary takeaway is that research in highly controversial and emotive issues must be based on open-mindedness and flexibility based on the context and individuals interviewed.


\textsuperscript{211} Clarinda Solberg, Genocide in Rwanda: Recurrence Risk Model Using Two Early Warning Models (2012) pg. 131


Guilt and Innocence

Today, twenty years down the line, many contributors to the analysis and discussion of the Rwandan genocide have appeared. Many books have been published on the memories of the Rwandan genocide but few, if any, focus on individual Hutu accounts. Even the books that explore Hutu accounts approach their study with an approach of “why did you do commit genocide?” instead of “what happened”? Such books focusing on the Rwandan genocide presuppose that Hutus are innately guilty and undeserving of telling their stories. Hutu stories carry the constraints of their pre-established guilt position. Such arguments may be difficult to disprove based on the empirical studies available regarding the Rwandan genocide.

According to some statistics, approximately 800,000 Hutus were accused of committing genocidal crimes during the post-genocide hearings.\(^2\) Out of this number, only five percent admitted guilt.\(^3\)

Remarkably, Scott Straus, a political science researcher of the Rwandan genocide, argues that the Rwandan genocide was not a popular movement amongst the Hutu population as often indicated by many scholars. Only around fourteen to seventeen percent of the adult male, Hutu population were perpetrators.\(^4\) Furthermore, during the genocide hearings, suspects often minimized their responsibility, often laying blame on other people. In Rwanda, the entire adult Hutu population is often assumed “guilty” of the genocidal crimes. On June 30\(^{th}\), 2013, President Paul Kagame, while meeting young people belonging to an organization called Youth Connect Dialogue, called for every child, adolescent and young adult of Hutu descent and blood to “apologize” for the crimes committed “in their name” by their parents and relatives during the genocide.\(^5\) Kagame’s call humiliates and degrades the Hutu population by declaring that all Hutus are genocidaires. This assumption is flawed since the young adults were either unborn or infants when the genocide happened. Since their social group is widely viewed as perpetrators,

\(^3\) Ibid
they were victims of the events. Besides, various sources remind us that not all Hutus participated in the genocide, and many moderate Hutus were even victims of the tragedy.

*Hutu diaspora and shared understanding*

In the diaspora, Hutu communities have undergone a transformation intensified by trauma, the stigma of the legacy of the genocide and the silence on Hutu stories about the genocide. The silence connected to the Hutu stories has risen because of the limited spaces for sharing of the Hutu accounts of the genocide. Consequently, many Hutus have emotionally struggled to find peace of mind in host countries. In some cases, Hutu refugees have rendered themselves stateless to refute the Rwandan identity associated with the genocide. The desire of many Hutus in the diaspora to dissociate themselves with the events in Rwanda arise from the fact that competing narratives of the Rwandan genocide have shaped an understanding of the genocide that has victimized the new generation of Hutus that have grown in the aftermath both at home and abroad. It is important to question how the new generation of Hutus in the diaspora will be incorporated in the quest for reconciliation in Rwanda and within the Rwandan community abroad.

*Public Individual Hutu Memories*

Personal stories, as previously mentioned, were hard to come by so I have used two publicly available Hutu accounts as supplemental information. By using these individuals’ publicly available stories, I make the argument that, although limited in size compared to the large Hutu population, the memory of people who identify as Hutu are perhaps not complimentary with the public memory of the Rwandan genocide. I utilize the stories of Paul Rusesabagina and Marie Beatrice Umutesi as representatives of publicly

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available individualized accounts. Individual accounts create a personalized way in which the past is represented in the present to people and ultimately to the society. Personal accounts allow Hutus to recollect the past thereby forcing personalized accounts into public domain. The “power of telling” is often imbued with dynamics that go deeper than just telling. It also liberates individuals whose stories are silenced. Hence, Hutu diaspora stories develop a new framework for the discussions on Rwandan genocide even as they liberate Hutus from their self-internalized guilt.

*Paul Rusesabagina*

Perhaps one of the most popular publicly available individual accounts of Hutus is the book *An Ordinary Man* by Paul Rusesabagina. Rusasebegina’s story diversifies available reports about the genocide. Rusasebegina’s father is Hutu, but his mother is a Tutsi. He is classified as Hutu because of the patriarchal family lineage in Rwandan society. Rusesabagina is also married to a Tutsi woman and has children of mixed ethnicity. The subject of Rusasebegina’s ethnicity is crucial to the analysis of individualized memories of the Rwandan genocide. Ethnicity in Rwanda, before the genocide, was important because it determined whether one lived or survived. However, ethnicity was often difficult to tell just by physical appearances as Rusesabagina notes, “the usual stereotype is that Tutsis are tall and thin with delicate noses, and Hutus are short, stocky with wider noses, but most people in Rwanda fit neither description.” Based on this statement, one can argue that many Hutus were mistakenly killed based on their looks. Similarly, some Tutsi might have survived because of their looks. Philip Gourevitch’s article “After the Genocide” published in the *New Yorker* reports the story of Laurent Nkongoli.

Nature presents countless exceptions. (“You can’t tell us apart,” Laurent Nkongoli, the Vice-President of the National Assembly, told me. “We can’t tell us apart. I was on a bus..."

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in the north once, and because I was in the north, where they”—Hutus—“were, and because I ate corn, which they eat, they said, ‘He’s one of us.’ But I’m a Tutsi from Butare.”

Rusasebegina’s statement about ethnicity and Nkongoli’s exceptional escape illustrates that ethnicity was just one among many factors that were at play in the genocide. Perhaps even, as observed by Davenport and Stam, the “majority of the victims (of the genocide) were likely Hutu and not Tutsis.” While I disagree with Davenport and Stem’s conclusion on this position, I contend that because of barred ethnic lines, there is a possibility that many Hutus were killed whose lives were not acknowledged and less likely to be remembered except by their families.

Secondly, Rusasebegina’s account shows that while ethnicity was presented as the dominant socio-political grouping model, other silent ways of societal groupings also mattered. In particular, there were sharp political divisions based on economic class, the level of education, political leanings, family histories and the likes. Today, Rusasebegina’s story has been deemed incorrect and far from actual events that happened at the Hotel Mille Collines. Edouard Kayihura’s Inside the Hotel Rwanda: The Surprising True Story... and why it Matters Today is perhaps the officially accepted rejoinder by alleged survivors who were allegedly protected by Rusesabagina. During the book launch in Kigali, Kayihura said: “Rusesabagina has always been a war profiteer and a friend of those who committed the genocide.” The very people he saved have thus branded Rusesabagina as “friends of the genocidaires.” Perhaps Rusasebegina’s account goes in line with Richeur’s position that ideology is often a combination of shared identity and experiences. Significantly ignored is the fact that Rusesabagina himself was also...

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a target of the genocide since Rusesabagina does not share the same ideology as the RPF leaders anymore. In the introduction of his book, Rusesabagina writes:

But it was not only Tutsis who were slaughtered in the genocide; it was also the thousands of moderate Hutus who were suspected of sympathizing with or even helping the Tutsi “cockroaches.” I was certainly one of these cockroach-lovers. Under the standards of mad extremism at work then I was a prime candidate for a beheading.228

Paul Rusesabagina’s *An Ordinary Man* is commonly read as a story about courage, diplomacy, heroism, survival, and calm amidst violence. Nevertheless, memory is also a central element in the book. Rusesabagina imbues his text with components that require a differentiation between public memory and personal experiences that arise from conventional narratives about the genocide, particularly the aspect of moral courage about the genocide often monopolized by the Kagame regime. Underlying this perception of moral courage is a self-centered and ignorant attitude toward other voices that challenge their view as the stoppers of the Rwandan genocide. *An Ordinary Man* presents the complexities of public memory vis-à-vis individualized accounts. Similarly, it reveals the banality of good in the face of moral decadence.229

Paul Rusesabagina argues that the genocide happened because the Hutu extremist party, Habiryamana’s National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD), and Paul Kagame’s RPF all wanted power without having to share it. All parties are culpable for the genocide. In fact, while many people believe that the RPF stopped the genocide, the events after the genocide reveal that RPF was also violent and committed mass killings.230 While limited mass murders are understandable after a genocide to restore calm, an excess of human rights violations is unwarranted. Human rights scholars such as Herman and Peterson have argued that the West has “swallowed a propaganda line on Rwanda that has turned the perpetrator and victim upside-down.”231 Herman and Peterson go further to argue that contrary to what is

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popularly believed, RPF not only killed Hutus but also committed “large-scale killing and ethnic cleansing of Hutus.”\textsuperscript{232} The following is an excerpt from an interview with Rusesabagina by Daniel Kovalia of the independent media outlet \textit{CounterPunch}.

From January 1 through December 31 of that year [1995], I saw myself with my own eyes, this [RPF] army tying people with their hands behind their backs and beating their chests, breaking it, throwing them into containers, burning their bodies, and spraying their ashes into the national game preserve. I am a witness to this. But, because the Hutus lost the war, they are the only ones being tried and convicted. Therefore, the international tribunal, the international criminal court for Rwanda, is a court for the losers. But, both have been killing civilians. They say that the Hutus committed the genocide, but the Tutsis also committed war crimes, crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{233}

On reconciliation, Rusesabagina argues that RPF regime is not in a position to champion for reconciliation. Rusasebegina’s account informs of two things: First, the Hutu extremists organized and planned the genocide to keep power. Second, it places the genocide in a context of a war between two power elites, one from Hutu and the other from the Tutsi. However, the memory and the examination of the conflict is one that is based on the victors’ story thus silencing voices of many Hutus that were equal victims of the genocide.\textsuperscript{234}

After gaining popularity from the movie and the book, Paul Rusesabagina has since become one of the leading faces of moral courage, the human rights campaign and a leading critic of Kagame’s presidency. On his talks at universities, conferences, and several television shows, Rusesabagina has reminded the world that he is a Hutu but has advocated against the genocide and had sought help to stop it using all the available means he had in his capacity as a hotel manager. Rusesabagina also stated that his story is not an exception as there many Hutus who helped friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Their stories deserve to be heard.\textsuperscript{235}

\textsuperscript{232} Edward Herman and David Peterson, \textit{The Politics of Genocide} (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010). Pg. 53-54
\textsuperscript{235} Paul Rusesabagina and Tom Zoellner, \textit{An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography} (New York: Viking, 2006) pg. chapter 1
Marie Beatrice Umutesi

Marie Beatrice Umutesi is a Rwandan writer who writes in French. According to Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of Rwandan Refugees in Zaire, Ms. Umutesi writes that she was born in the northern town of Byumba. Umutesi self-identifies as a moderate Hutu. She studied sociology and rural development in Rwanda. At the height of the Rwandan genocide, Umutesi was forced to flee into neighboring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) because she was an enemy of both the Hutu extremists and RPF army. Umutesi’s story illustrates the hardship experienced by Rwandan refugees of both ethnicities during the genocide and the subsequent refugee crisis in the neighboring countries.

Umutesi gives two reasons for writing her book. First, she wanted to tell her personal account of what happened to her. She would like the world to hear her story as a Hutu refugee and a victim of violence in the great lakes region of Africa. She also wrote her story because of her adopted son, Muhawe. Muhawe’s mother died during the trek from Rwanda into Zaire. Her second reason is collective. Umutesi would like for the memories of Rwandan refugees in Zaire to be remembered even as the world remembers the lives of Tutsis who died during the genocide of 1994.

Umutesi’s story contrasts with conventional knowledge about the Rwandan genocide. Upon reading the title of the book, one can wrongly conclude that it is a story of a Tutsi survivor in Zaire. However, Umutesi’s story reminds us that war has always captured the essence of life in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and Tutsis are not the only victims of such wars. According to Umutesi, divisionism in Rwandan was not only ethnic, but it was also based on class. She argues that each ethnicity – Hutu and Tutsi- treated the less fortunate members of their communities unfairly.

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236 Marie Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004) pg xi
237 Ibid xi
238 Ibid xii
239 Aili Mari, "Project MUSE - Commentaries on Marie Beatrice Umutesi's Surviving the Slaughter: Introduction to ASR Focus."
Similarly, Umutesi’s account tells the story of a Rwandan Hutu refugee caught in the mix of what Gerard Prunier has described as the “African World War.”240 The war is multifaceted since it happens amidst several layers of conflicts. On one side is the Hutu and Tutsi rivalry extended in the Congo.241 However, underneath is the conflict between different factions of Tutsis and Hutus. These factions fight for the control of mineral deposits in the Congo.242 There are the rebel groups within the Congo with aspirations of taking power in Kinshasa. Also, there are armies of different countries including Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Angola among others. Similarly, some mercenaries are operating to protect the interests of European and American corporations.243

Remarkably, this is only a fraction of her account. Her story is a continuation of the Rwandan conflict that turned into a genocide and then spread across the border to Zaire engulfing almost a third of the African land mass.244 Umutesi argues that RPF orchestrated the Rwandan involvement in Zaire after capturing Kigali. The RPF’s pretext was that Hutu perpetrators were hiding in Zaire while making plans to come back to Rwanda and commit another genocide.245 During this war, RPF soldiers systematically murdered thousands of Hutu refugees. The Zairean territory became the battleground for settling scores that were unfinished in Rwanda of 1994. These atrocities were not only committed by RPF soldiers but were also delegated to rebel groups, often financed by illegally acquired mineral mines and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda.246

Although a personal account, Umutesi’s book records the forced, chaotic, and exceedingly traumatizing journey of Rwandan refugees for thousands of miles in search of peace. After two years of wandering in

242 Ibid pg. 109
245 Eric Stover, Victor Pekin, and Alexa Koenig, Hiding in Plain Sight: The Pursuit of War Criminals from Nuremberg to the War on Terror (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016) pg. 217
the jungles of Zaire, the author, and her company found peace even though thousands of Hutu refugees had died. Umutesi starts the journey when the country was called Zaire and under the leadership of Mobutu Sesseseko but arrives in Kinshasa when the state had changed its name to the Democratic Republic of Congo, under the leadership of RPF-backed leader Joseph Kabila. Umutesi’s book is a “lived account” of Hutu refugee and documents not only death but also an excess of human rights violations committed by both Hutu extremists and RPF in the name of defending the Tutsi minority.  

Faced with many ordeals, including deaths of children under her care from starvation and exhaustion, Umutesi resorts to spiritualism as a coping mechanism. She also describes the situation of other Hutu refugees. In one instance, she describes the case of an emaciated young Hutu girl who preferred to die instead of continually running from attackers. In another example, a teenage adolescent Hutu opts to run faster than the rest of her group only to be slaughtered at a bridge by a rival group. The level of human suffering in the book is sometimes unbearable, but she writes honest and captivating stories so the reader can empathize with the Hutu refugees in Zaire.

In an interview with Swedish journalist Felix Holmgren of Eurozine magazine, Umutesi argued that both Hutus and Tutsis committed crimes against humanity. She went further to elaborate that the international community first betrayed the Tutsi and then did the same against the Hutu after the genocide was over. Below is an excerpt from the interview:

I visited Belgium in 1995, lectured about the refugee camps, and voiced my opinion about the situation in Rwanda, and I was also interviewed on the radio. My views were the same as they are today. Not all Hutus participated in the genocide, and not all Tutsis are victims. Hutus, as well as Tutsis, committed crimes against humanity. For me, the only way to proceed would be to arrest everyone who is guilty and prosecute him or her so that all Rwandans can feel that justice has been done. The interview reached ears in Rwanda, and

I was informed through friends that I could not return home. At best, I would have been imprisoned and at worst killed.

Life in the camps was so arduous that I think people would have returned home if they hadn't feared for their lives, but the security situation in Rwanda was disastrous. One report concluded that the RPF was responsible for massacres of more than thirteen thousand people. An article in the French paper Liberation said that the RPF had killed more than a hundred thousand people. We were flooded with such information.\textsuperscript{250}

Umutesi’s account confirms that even though the RPF was accredited for ending the Rwandan civil war and stopping the genocide of 1994, they have also faced accusations of reprisal killings attributed to the victors. In late 1994 and early 1995, the RPF executed a large number of suspects and carried out attacks on Hutu civilians. These revenge attacks happened in places such as Kibeho refugee camp in Western Rwanda. It is reported that on April 22, 1995, RPF soldiers killed between 2000-8000 Hutu civilians.\textsuperscript{251} Additionally, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) said that RPF killed thousands of civilians per month in the aftermath of the genocide. While these attacks were not genocidal, they mostly targeted Hutus, as their intention was revenge. However, in the remembrance of the genocide, these accusations are seldom reported.\textsuperscript{252}

This atmosphere of violence without recourse to legal proceedings cause unease among many Hutus as exemplified by the personal accounts of Rusesabagina and Umutesi.\textsuperscript{253} Whereas the Rwandan government does not deny that some members of RPF did commit human rights violations, the Rwandan state stresses that rogue officers committed these Hutu massacres, and the government did not orchestrate the killings. For this position, the government of Rwanda had made a claim for the lack of moral equivalence as to the nature of the crimes committed by the RPF and those perpetrated by Hutu extremists. Consequently, they

\textsuperscript{251} Marie Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire}. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004) pg.69
\textsuperscript{252} Marie Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire}. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004) pg. xv
\textsuperscript{253} Philip Clark, \textit{The Gacaca Courts, Post-genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)pg.20
argue that trials do not belong in the same judicial avenues as those that committed the genocide.\(^\text{254}\) This position contradicts the position of RPF as the guardians of morality and immune from the accusation of violence. Underlying in Umutesi’s account is the question: Is there a possibility that the RPF-led Rwandan state violated human rights? Are these infringements ignorable because of the complexity of genocide? If that is the case, then is it fair to demand a human rights record similar to the one expected of countries that have not experienced a genocide? Perhaps a great start would be employing Ricœur’s argument that human consciousness has limits and that memory is a question of interpretations.\(^\text{255}\) Consequently, the contrasting relationship between public and private memory works in a complex association that derives influence from context, power, and public perception.

Examined from the perspective of “individual’s rights,” the RPF did not have the option of vengeance. As noted by transitional justice scholar Paul Burnham, in *Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation*, Rwanda is a nation-state, a member of the United Nations, and a signatory to the Geneva Convention. As such, Rwanda may be culturally collective, but it is bounded by human rights principles that expect nation-states to respect individual rights.\(^\text{256}\) About human rights, Rwanda’s determination for justice necessitated trials or other models of justice but not revenge. In a speech in 1995, Kagame said, "You must be careful not to wreak vengeance," he said. "I promise we will bring to justice those responsible for the massacres."\(^\text{257}\)

Both Rusesabagina and Umutesi have stated that their respective accounts do not weaken the enormity of the genocide carried out on the Tutsis in Rwanda. Instead, Rusesabagina and Umutesi’s accounts elevate


parallels between public accounts and individualized accounts. Public memory often holds a one-dimensional view of the Rwandan genocide. The view is often that the Hutu majority killed with intent to exterminate the Tutsi minority in Rwanda. While Hutu majority killed the Tutsi minorities, personal stories from these publicly available accounts has not pardoned the Tutsi minorities from retaliatory crimes. Perhaps it would be prudent to argue the conventional stories about genocide and mass murders are more complicated than what the world knows. Usually, the typical stories are simplistic and do not cover all the aspects of the moral, political, and historical background of such conflicts.

Correspondingly, Rusesabagina and Umutesi’s accounts symbolize the fate of ordinary people in times of wars. In the same way, Umutesi and Rusasebegina’s report perpetuate the controversial debate on the “the legitimacy over memory.” In so doing, determining the right to be remembered and how that memory is undertaken.

**Individual accounts**

The following stories belong to ten Rwandan Hutus who live in the United States that I interviewed in the process of this research. While talking to these individuals, I wanted to investigate if the usual narrative about memory and reconciliation matches with the stories of Hutu diaspora. I begin my inquiry citing the work of George Orwell in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as analyzed by Judi River. In this book, a lower cadre bureaucrat named Winston Smith is charged with silencing political discord by hiding documents that the government conceives as inconvenient in what is described as a “memory hole.” Winston works in the Ministry of Truth where the government utilizes incinerators to burn the inconvenient documents, so they

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are not remembered in popular discourse. Using this process, authorities in Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* can manipulate history and re-write it based on their perceptions and realities. The incinerators act as machines of forgetting and destruction of individual memories. George Orwell’s work is prophetic about the situation in Rwanda. In Rwanda, the Hutu diaspora has increasingly become hostile towards the RPF-controlled state. However, such hostilities are symptoms of much deeper frustrations about the memorialization of the Rwandan genocide as well the ubiquity of torture for those that attempt to argue otherwise. Relatedly, Ricoeur argues that the experience of others is as important as the experience of self. Hence, the phenomenology of social world permeates into the order of life, which in its essence is the shared experience of living together. In this context, acting and sufferings are shareable and translatable into memory. Therefore, memory becomes a threefold affair, “memory to oneself, to one’s close relations, and to others.”

The following is an analysis of accounts from Rwandan Hutu diaspora about memories of the Rwandan genocide. Because it might be hard for the reader to follow the names and accounts of the respondents, I have included a table at the end of this chapter. The table will help users keep track of the memories of ten Hutus who I have interviewed.

Incorrect memories

While reading this section of this thesis, I would like my reader to keep in mind Ricœur’s ideas about the conflicting nature of individual narratives and public accounts. In addition, I consider the meaning of memory in the question, what is memory? Is memory merely a recollection of past events? Could it possible that memory is perhaps a vessel of power and that some memories are even dangerous. Ricœur

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highlights the dangerousness of memory of memory by hinting on the idea of memory and truth. “This is the question of the reliability of memory, and in this sense, of its truth.” Upon reading these individual accounts, it will be perchance possible that a specific narrative is in the making in the Rwanda concerning the genocide. The narrative is conceivable, contrary to the lived experiences of ordinary Rwandans Hutus. Ricoeur’s work is influential in establishing a theoretical base for this analysis.

According to Kevin Nzigiyamana, a 33-year-old Rwandan Hutu, who lives in New Jersey, Rwandan politics is destructive, and the political system is designed to hold the majority of the population as hostages of justice. The country lacks freedom of expression, and the usual Kwibuka ceremonies are a mockery for genocide survivors. Kevin came to the United States in 2011 on an exchange program but sought an asylum application after the completion of his program. Kevin has siblings in Rwanda who are adults. “In 1994, I was an eleven-year-old boy in the southern province of Rwanda. I first heard the word genocide in 1996, and it has stuck to my mind until today. I witnessed the war before the genocide, then I saw the genocide, and after the genocide, I saw the killings of Hutu refugees and persecution of the Hutu after RPF had taken over. Today, I witness the lies being told at genocide memorials.”

Kevin argues that the Rwandan state is militarized, and the regime uses fear to govern the citizens. Kevin also said that despite the widely held view that RPF stopped the genocide, “genocide stopped because many people had fled the country and many had died.” Kevin also states that RPF insiders who had a much broader plan of power acquisition started the genocide: “Kagame knew that by killing the president, Hutus will rise against the Tutsis. RPF would then take advantage of the chaos and acquire power. These are not only my words. They are backed up by evidence. Watch the BBC documentary Untold Story, read the Human Rights report on the genocide as well as Manning’s report and other documentaries.”

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264 Paul Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellaur. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) pg. 54
According to Kevin, the word “genocide” silences opposition to the Rwandan state. “During genocide memorials, all Hutus automatically become second-class citizens who are monsters. On television, radio, and in newspapers there are agonizing pictures, reports, and commentaries about dead Tutsis. There is always nothing about dead Hutus.” By giving life to the genocide, the memorial week ensures that RPF looks legitimate. “It’s like a rent that we [Hutus] have to pay every year,” Kevin says.

In Kevin’s view, even though the genocide is now a “Tutsi genocide,” many Hutus died and are not remembered. These Hutus died protecting friends, family, and even strangers. Some of them were killed because they joined the RPF army. Now, there is a class of people that has to be remembered and one that is not worthy of remembering. “Millions of people died from 1991, all the skeletons and bones were collected and taken to the memorial centers and classified as Tutsis, and do you think that is true? There are bones of Hutu and Twa people too.”

Kevin stated that he lost siblings during the war. Other family members were killed in the Congo. “I was on my own for months, and I survived mostly because some white people took me to a refugee camp. I was in the Congo from 1994-1997. I managed to reunite with some of my family members but as soon as we settled in Rwanda, some of my older siblings were arrested and taken to jail for genocide trial. Every man in Rwanda, who was Hutu and was over 16 years old, was a perpetrator at that time.”

Kevin’s testimony speaks to how convoluted the memory of Rwandan genocide is. While one might be excused from the complexity of the situation by examining the genocide just as a single event, such an action would be detrimental to the overall goal of the reconciliation process. As such, in the words of Judi River, “testimony speaks to how one perceives suffering as it moves from the individual level into a realm
of sanctioned mass violence that is acceptable." The denial of Hutu stories is perhaps akin to normalizing violence on one side, in this case, Hutus while castigating acts of violence on the Tutsi side. A balanced memorialization is, given the extremity of the Rwandan case, the first step in the recognition of the Ubuntu (humanity) of the dead.

**Revenge and split emotions**

The usual story about the Rwandan genocide is that Hutus went out of their way to kill Tutsis in an animalistic fashion. Some accounts even highlight cases of Hutu men who killed their wives and children because the children had Tutsi blood. While such stories might be true, there are also contrary narratives of the same events. I interviewed Filone Muziranenge, a Rwandan woman born in Kigali, Rwanda in April 1987. Filone’s family is from Eastern Rwanda. Eastern Rwanda borders Uganda. It was from Eastern Rwanda that RPF army marched into Rwanda from Uganda, an action that Habiryamana’s regime considered an invasion. Filone’s father comes from Eastern Rwanda, and he is from Hutu ethnicity. Her mother was Tutsi. Because of Rwandan culture of taking the father’s ethnicity, Filone considers herself a Hutu. Filone lives in St. Louis, Missouri and is in the United States as a refugee from Rwanda.

During the genocide, my family was split right in the middle because my father was a Hutu and my mother, a Tutsi. However, we did not have the mindset of many of the people involved in the sickness of murder, rape, and plunder. We were a family, and we did not see each other as Tutsi or Hutu. My father loved my mother and her entire family. He could never think of harming them. Because of the dilemma of loyalty, our family decided to flee the Democratic Republic of Congo. We were refugees in Congo living with friends. My family of four siblings, my dad, and mother all was housed in a single home of a church member.

We had to stay here for approximately six months living off the meager savings that my dad had as a teacher. It was cumbersome. We were running away from Rwanda because of two reasons. First, my family, being Christians and non-political did not want to take sides in the conflict in Rwanda. Second, even after RPF had taken control of Rwanda, they, in turn, committed even more murder in the name of securing the country. Many Hutu moderates were killed in vengeful attacks. We feared we could be targeted. Unfortunately, my mother died by the hands of RPF soldiers who were chasing after my father. They


assumed that we were all Hutus. At the same time, my mother’s relatives were killed in the genocide. In the revenge attacks of 1996-1997, my father lost half of his family either in Congo refugee camps or Western Rwanda.

Filone’s story contradicts what most people usually hear about the Rwandan genocide. Filone’s mother is a Tutsi woman killed by RPF soldiers. Why would this happen? It is hard to believe based on the conventional understanding of the genocide. For many in Rwanda’s RPF regime, Filone’s account qualifies for dismissal and not worthy of memory. However, it has been documented that, unlike the Hutu extremists, RPF never intended to wipe out the entire Hutu people. For this reason, RPF’s crimes were not genocidal. Nonetheless, the RPF soldiers killed thousands of Hutus at Kibeho and Giti between 1996 and 1997. In Gisenyi, the RPF arrested most Hutu males, accusing them of being secret members of the Intarerahamwe. According to most Hutus, RPF’s killings continued even after the genocide had stopped. Consequently, the RPF atrocities are as punishable just as the genocide crimes. Filone’s story shows that many Hutus were victims even though ordinarily they are not recognized. It further demonstrates the level of intricacy regarding the Rwandan genocide. One asks the question; whose story is worth memory? Moreover, the answer to this issue gets more complicated as the various stories of Rwandans are told.

Some Hutus do not share this form of misalignment of Hutu stories with the conventional understanding of the Rwandan genocide. Theophile Mugabo, self-identified Hutu government official at the Rwandan embassy in Washington D.C., contradicts the testimonies of many Hutus in the diaspora. According to Theophile, the memorialization of the Rwandan genocide is accurate to what happened. There was a genocide against the Tutsi. The genocide was followed by a “small conflict that affected Hutus.” In such circumstances, it is important to focus on the bigger picture than the complexities of every situation. Even though Theophile argues that the Rwandan state in the post-genocide has been slightly authoritarian, he

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also claims that some level of authoritarianism is required to protect the Tutsis against another genocide. In the words of Theophile, “the government is the only hope for Tutsis. We must put ourselves in their shoes, and for that reason, and the government has to force reconciliation if it cannot happen willingly.” Theophile concluded his short interview session by showing me pictures of a beautiful and clean Kigali and reaffirming to me that it was most important to look for the common good than focusing on little anomalies.

Perhaps Theophile’s account is a candid account of what Rwanda is today – a beautiful city of Kigali, rising middle class, a haven of Western development workers, and an active player in regional politics- a neoliberal economy on the verge of industrialization. Nevertheless, it also raises many questions. For example, how is it that Theophile was in a hurry to get the interview done? Is Theophile an example of a Hutu who has reconciled with himself about the genocide? I gathered after the interview that Theophile was one of the Hutus in the diaspora that Kevin had described, “as eating with the government.” While “eating with the government,” Hutus submerge their inner feelings and tell manufactured views about the genocide and the civil war in Rwanda. This way, they dissociate with the Hutu guilt and tell accepted stories by RPF regime. By doing this, Hutus ensure survival by gaining access to jobs and remain unscathed from the strong authoritarian state.

Pamela Mkombozi shares Theophile's sentiments. Pamela is a 22-year old Rwandan student living in Detroit, Michigan. By the time of the interview, Pamela had only lived in the United States for ten months. Pamela’s mother is Hutu, but her father who is Tutsi died during the genocide. Pamela was born one month after the genocide. In Rwanda, Pamela is considered a genocide survivor. Pamela argued, “President Paul Kagame should be credited for stopping the genocide. His government helped survivors,

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widows, and offered scholarships for the victims like me. The United Nations did not help anything.”

When I asked Pamela if the genocide is remembered in a one-sided manner, she argued that the genocide is commemorated that way because of Hutu shame. “Hutus feel ashamed to sit with people who lost members of their families.” However, Pamela argued that it is wrong that Hutu moderates who protected many Tutsis are not remembered.

Hutu survivors should be recognized depending on how they died. If they died protecting Tutsis, they should be remembered, however, if they perished in the war, then it was a war. If you died in the process of killing other innocent people, why should your life be remembered? The commemoration is the only space where survivors get the chance to connect with the dead. How will Tutsis feel if Hutu lives are also remembered in the same place? Will there be commemorations?

Pamela’s testimony falls in the category of Rwandans of a new generation. Pamela declined to side with either side during the interview. However, as the conversation progressed, I questioned if her objectivity was because of her split-identity. Born of a Hutu mother and Tutsi father, Pamela carried the burden of both ethnicities. Was it because Pamela is in the United States courtesy of RPF scholarships to people RPF consider as genocide survivors?

As I interviewed other Hutus, a pattern started to emerge. I deduced that in the diaspora, there are two kinds of Rwandans. The first group works with the Rwandan government. They try to attend all the commemoration events and the state events led by Kagame. They frequently get their expenses paid for and live a luxurious life. Their children go back to Rwanda to college because they have easy access to the right jobs. They are mostly Tutsis with few Hutus that support the Rwandan regime. The second group includes adversaries of the Rwandan state. They are majorly Hutu but with few Tutsis. They do not attend commemoration events. They sometimes protest outside embassies and behind Kagame’s

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270 Filip Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda* (Cambridge University Press, 2013) pg. 331
motorcade in New York every year at the UN convention. For many pro-RPF Rwandans, these Rwandans in the diaspora are genocide deniers. The stories are not worth telling.

Recent political developments

At the turn of the 21st century, the RPF regime under the leadership Kagame has solidified its moral and political acceptability with the help of Western media, its government bureaucracy, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations. The RPF government has possibly gained its legitimacy by continually telling a narrative of good and evil. The RPF is the good while the bad are the Hutu extremists. Western nations abandoned Rwanda at the hour of need. Confronted with the apparent lack of moral authority, Western actors have not had an option but to accept RPF regime without many considerations of its flaws including accusations of ethnic cleansing. Rwandan foreign policy today is perhaps one defined by politics of victimhood and exaggerated claims of an existential threat from Hutu extremists. The prevalent inertness of the international community has allowed the regime to run an authoritarian and militaristic state.

One Hutu interviewee, Jerome Tuyishime, has documented the militarization of the state under RPF. Jerome is a 27-year old Rwandan graduate student in Geospatial Engineering and lives in Dallas, Texas. Jerome said:

> On July 2013, soldiers in civilian clothes arrested me while I was undertaking my regular duties in the Western province. I was a technician charged with property appraisals. I worked on land and houses. My job included estimating the value of properties so that I could help their owners’ access loans and credit from the banks. That evening, after completing my work, two soldiers wearing civilian clothes arrested me. I was grouped together with six other people who had also been arrested. They grouped us together so they could wait for more people so that they could combine

272 John Idris Lahai and Tanya Lyons, African Frontiers: Insurgency, Governance and Peacebuilding in Postcolonial States (Australia: Flinders University, 2015) pg. 46
us and forcefully recruit us to the M23, a Rwanda-backed rebel group in Rwanda. When it was dusk, I asked to go the restroom, escaped from the window, and hid in the forest. They looked at me for hours, but I was lucky to hide in a thick bush. When I was sure they were gone, I walked and took a bus to Kigali. Had they caught me, it would be the end of my life. The Rwandan government has denied any implications on M23 rebels. However, it is widely known that Rwanda government is forcefully recruiting people to fight in the Congo. Anybody with some form of evidence is considered a threat to the stability of the regime. They mostly target young Hutu men. After these events, I applied for a scholarship and was admitted to a university in the U.S. I have decided not to return to Rwanda.

Jerome’s account indicates that, in the post-genocide Rwanda, safety for most Rwandan Hutu relies on their close relationship with the RPF regime. Not many Rwandan Hutus have the courage testify against the administration. In some cases, giving testimony on the atrocities committed by the regime could lead to one’s death. Many Rwandans have disappeared while attempting to raise their voices against the excesses of the current administration. Because of the authoritarian nature of the RPF regime, spaces that allow divergent voices to come out and agitate for the memorialization of Hutu victims are sanctioned. As we have seen, the conflicting narratives of the Rwandan Hutus are not complimentary with the public memory of the genocide.

Conclusion

Wars may be germane to human history, but conflicts resulting in genocides are rare. When such conflicts occur, they leave a lasting impression on the survivors. Many governments create spaces that aid the survivors in remembering the atrocities and provide hope that such events would not reoccur. These memory spaces sometimes include public spaces such as national television shows, genocide memorials, museums, and statues among others. Nonetheless, individuals also have private memories based on lived experience regarding such tragic events. These personal memories can sometimes be synonymous with the public memory, but other times they contradict public memory. Based on these stories of Hutus in the United States, I argue that Hutu memories are sanctioned. The undermining of Hutu memories serves two purposes. First, it possibly allows the RPF regime under Paul Kagame to gain legitimacy from the
international community. Second, suppressing the conflicting stories perhaps helps RPF assume that it prevents Hutus from reorganizing another genocide.

However, with the idea of respecting all concerned voices, this study suggests that private memories of Hutus are not complimentary with the public remembrance of the genocide since the official commemorations focus on a Tutsi-inspired story. This research enriches our understanding of the Rwandan genocide from the perspective of diaspora Hutus. Also, the study reckons that RPF could be a destabilizing force that deters accountability and reconciliation. I postulate that it is only through a shared understanding that any loss of human life is a criminal act, which Rwanda will be able to forge a realistic peaceful future.
### Table Summarizing Individualized Accounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Rwandan Interviewees and names of Individuals whose stories were used.</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>Country or City of residence if the US</th>
<th>Status in the U.S</th>
<th>Type of memory</th>
<th>Memory of the Genocide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Rusesabagina</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Mixed (Identifies as Hutu).</td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium, and Los Angeles, CA.</td>
<td>Frequent visitor of US</td>
<td>Citizen of Belgium</td>
<td>Publicly Available Individualized account. Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Beatrice Umutesi</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Visits US occasionally</td>
<td></td>
<td>Publicly Available Individualized account. Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Testimony Type</td>
<td>Testimony Content</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Himbara</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>Frequent US visitor testified to US Congress about Kagame regime</td>
<td>Publicly available account, The Internet, news reports and TV (Not cited on thesis). One sided memory that hero-worships Paul Kagame. Many Rwandans are scared into silence; the idea of the Rwandan economic miracle is a façade. Moreover, RPF is responsible for creating a monster out of Kagame. Many political opponents are exiled. Some have been killed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Nzigiyamana</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Atlantic City, NJ</td>
<td>Asylum</td>
<td>Personal account Lies are told at genocide memorials. Genocide stopped because many people had fled and almost all Tutsis had died. RPF did not stop genocide. Kagame downed the plane to cause mayhem so he can invade Kigali and capture power. Hutus are not remembered. Millions died from 1990-2000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filone Muziranega</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Mixed (Identifies as Hutu).</td>
<td>St. Louis, MO</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Personal account Tutsi mother died at the hands of Tutsi soldiers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Witnessed murders perpetrated by both Hutu extremists and Tutsi soldiers. Hutu deaths are undermined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Account Type</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pamela Mkombozi</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Detroit, Michigan</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Personal account</td>
<td>Paul Kagame should be credited for stopping the genocide. Hutus feel ashamed to sit with people who lost family members. Hutu victims should be remembered based on how they died. How will Tutsis feel if Hutu deaths are remembered equally?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theophile Mugabo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Washington, D.C</td>
<td>Rwandan government worker at Rwandan embassy, D.C</td>
<td>Personal account</td>
<td>Memorialization of the genocide is accurate to what happened. The government is the only hope for Tutsis. The government has to force reconciliation if it can’t happen organically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerome Tuyishime</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Dallas, TX</td>
<td>Graduate Student</td>
<td>Personal account</td>
<td>It is widely known that Rwandan government is recruiting young men as fighters for rebel groups in DRC. People with evidence are considered threats to the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Account Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pendo Mutedli</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Denver, CO</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Personal account</td>
<td>War is war; genocide was the apex of the Rwandan war. Memory focuses on the stories of those who won the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Habima</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Maine, USA</td>
<td>Greencard Holder</td>
<td>Personal account</td>
<td>Many Rwandans fear to talk about the genocide. It's a test of morality. If you are Hutu, you are judged as a criminal. Memory reinforces such beliefs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Five: Conclusion
This thesis has contrasted public memory of the Rwandan genocide with individualized accounts of Hutus in the United States. While focusing on Rwandan conflict as a “continuum of violence,” the study finds that there is a possible gap between personal memories of Hutus in the United States and public memorialization of the Rwandan genocide. Paul Ricœur’s theory of memory applies in this case because it connects personal memory and public memory. According to Ricœur, the abundance of public memory does not imply that only one memory exists.²⁷⁵ Often, individualized memories contrast with public memorials. The Rwandan government offers a public memory that condenses the genocide into a single event. Nonetheless, reducing the genocide into a single tragedy minimizes memories of most Hutus. As discussed in the individual accounts chapter as well as the introduction, the Rwandan genocide happened in a context of civil war, which occurred in a background of European colonization and the push for post-cold war democratization.

During the war between Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan National Army under National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD), civilian Rwandans lost their lives. These civilians were substantially Hutus but also Tutsis. Secondly, in the genocide, thousands of Hutus also died alongside Tutsis. Many Hutus were moderates and died because they were traitors in the eyes of Hutu extremists. Other Hutus died protecting Tutsis; some were mistakenly killed, and RPF killed others in revenge attacks. Lastly, thousands of Hutus lost their lives while seeking refuge in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the genocide had ended courtesy of revenge attacks by the RPF army. The lives of Hutus who died in this cycle of violence are often minimized in public commemorations. Thus, I argue that the memory of the Rwandan genocide is possibly politicized and incomplete.

Currently, restrictions exist that manages public remembrance, education, and conversations about the Rwandan genocide. The memory of the Rwandan genocide is a matter of political consideration by the Rwandan government, civil society and the social fabric of the citizens. The restrictions on the memory of the genocide are conducted through limitations of the fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, methods of remembrance, and minimization of ethnic identity. Feasibly, there is an inconsistency on commemorations in public, memory as taught in schools, and mass distributed on the media with what Rwandan Hutu survivors remember in private.

My findings agree with Nuquet and Lipstadt's argument that public memory and individual memory has an “adversarial relationship.” In Rwanda, there is a possibility that public memory does not complement personal narratives about the genocide. The twelve personal accounts of the Hutus interviewed as well as the scholarly work show that there is a likelihood of incompatibility of memories. Likewise, the Rwandan government is attempting to create what Casey calls “a futuristic narrative” that defies the nuanced lived experience of genocide survivors. This futuristic narrative is according to Ricœur, a “perception of historical experience” of the minorities in Rwanda, in this case, the Tutsi elites and thus, a “construction of historical consciousness” as described by Zarka.

Secondly, having established the incompleteness of how the genocide is remembered in Rwanda, I sought answers as to why there is an absence of Hutu memories. I found out that public memories play a critical role in the visualization of events even as public memory create history. Over time, personal memories

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278 Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. (New York, 2006).
279 Edward, Casey "Public Memory in Place and Time." In Framing Public Memory (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004) pg. 17
280 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History and Forgetting (Chicago, U.S: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 82
substitute for individual memories, because as observed by memory theorist, Edward Clay, the individual memory is rich in details and juxtaposes public memory. If individualized memories come to the surface, the legitimacy of the RPF will perhaps come into question. Hutu memories undermine the officially acknowledged account of events that hold the view that Hutu extremists killed Tutsis and moderate Hutus and that RPF stopped the genocide after multitudes of Hutus had killed Tutsis. The officially acknowledged narrative skips the events that happened in the continuum of violence that ravaged the country from 1990-2000s. Hutu memories possibly indict RPF for violations of human rights. If Hutu memories are publicized, they will perhaps render the official account of the genocide reductionist.

Thirdly, public memory accompanies the demand for justice and accountability for the lives lost. In Rwanda, the government’s policy approaches “post-genocide justice on the presumption of a criminal (adult male Hutu) population is a useful mechanism that the RPF strategically deploys to control political opponents, deflect criticism of its actions during the genocide, and justify its military presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Rwanda faces the challenge of obfuscating justice and legitimating abuses done under the pretext of ending impunity, accountability, and reconciliation by limiting Hutu memories. Avoiding this predicament requires that memorials focus in ways that expose, remember and understand political violence and are also in tension with their role as tools for establishing stability and legitimizing compromises.

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282 Edward, Casey "Public Memory in Place and Time." In Framing Public Memory (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004) pg. 17
Perhaps the possibility of obfuscating justice is present in Rwanda where political upheavals have been the norm since the end of the genocide in 1994. Because of the ethnic tensions, public memory not only acts as a political memorial to the dead, they serve as agents of political repression of the opposing ethnic group. In mass violence, the perpetrators may at times also become victims and vice-versa. In the public accounts about the Rwandan genocide, the government has drawn a clear distinction between the perpetrators and victims. Nevertheless, the act of distinguishing Rwandans as perpetrators and victims pose challenges such as inhibiting closure, validating other lives (Tutsis) while minimizing (Hutu) lives, as well as restricting history.

While examining conflicts in Africa, the prevailing argument espouses a great deal of the debate post-colonially involves the role of the state, acquisition of power, the concentration of power in the hands of the few and the use of that acquired power for self-preservation. Few writers such as Robert Bates and Gerard Prunier have explored the failure of the African state and its relevance to conflicts in the late 1990s. Conflicts are common in societies where the central control center has weakened. In such places, the local leaders controlling non-state resources find themselves able to offer more than the central government. At the heart of this reasoning is poverty as a causative factor. Poverty plays a fundamental role in not only legitimizing conflicts but also making conflicts a necessity. Whereas technological expansion, availability of the market, and efficient international network for illegal materials fuel mass disputes, the driving engine for these tragic events is the failure of some states to provide human security. Even though Rwanda also had other causes, this argument helps explain the multiplicities of the causative factors of the Rwandan genocide. Therefore, even as much as ethnicity was used as a reason to kill a section of the populace, the tragic events happened not because of the revival of ancient ethnic hatred, but because of many other causes. These causes include but are not limited to a deadly squabble for control of the state by the elites of both sides, failure of the concept of the nation-state in the post-colonial world,

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pressure on existing resources, and the impact of the structural adjustment policies of neoliberalism. Most Rwandans believe that both sides committed crimes and that true reconciliation must factor in an indiscriminate and holistic revelation of atrocities. Sanctioning of Hutu memories only limits the reconciliation process.

It is possible to argue that within the complexity of the Rwandan genocide, public memory develops into the ultimate source of the grievance by Hutus for justice, and possibly, a regime change. Genocide memorials, although exercised as means of expressing shared griefs, construct the meaning of the past atrocities. At the same time, because of the power of the discourse exhibited by the existence of the government’s official narratives, many Rwandans are denied the opportunities to mourn their dead. Perhaps, a historical clarity is necessary for future stability and development of Rwanda. Further, sidelining of individualized memories, especially of concerns of not acknowledging the dead, will not absolve the country from future conflicts since it will deter true and genuine reconciliation. This study utilized memory as a measure of the possibility of sustained peace and success of the reconciliation. In many ways, Rwanda is a “volcano waiting to erupt” not because the people of Rwanda are innately murderers, but because the same conditions that led to the genocide are prevailing, and the preservation of power than the use of power to reconcile the society is still the primary concern of the state.

289 Philip Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pg. 5
291 Rachel Ibreck, “A Time of Mourning: The Politics of Commemorating Tutsi-Genocide in Rwanda” pg 100
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